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THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
OF TRANS-SUBSTANTIVITY IN
FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE
David Marcus*

INTRODUCTION

The procedural system in the federal courts before the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938 tended toward staggering complexity. Federal courts applied one set of rules in equity, while in cases at
law, federal procedure had to conform "as near as may be" to the
rules of the state in which the judge sat.' A federal judge in New
York, for example, would have juggled equity rules, a procedural code
with 1,536 sections, 2 and special "federal practice rules" for instances
when the state code was inoperable or inappropriate for federal litigation. 3 In comparison, the Federal Rules, at least on the surface, 4 offer
a procedural canvass of stunning simplicity. The procedural backbone
for the largest court system in the country consists of fewer than one
5
hundred rules currently in force.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arizona Rogers College of Law. Many thanks to
Barbara Atwood, Jack Chin, Jim Pfander, Toni Massaro, Rick Marcus, Marc Miller, Carol Rose,
Ted Schneyer, Bob Rabin, Nina Rabin, and the participants at the 15th Annual Clifford Symposium for comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. Steve Burbank was particularly generous
with his time and feedback. I am grateful to Steve Landsman for inviting me to participate in the
symposium. Nick Klingerman, J.D. candidate 2010, University of Arizona Rogers College of
Law, provided excellent research assistance.
1. CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 31-34 (2d ed. 1947).
Clark noted that "[t]he resulting discord tended to make the practice of each federal district
indigenous and unique." Id. at 34.
2. See George W. Wickersham, Editorial Comment, The New York PracticeAct, 29 YALE L.J.
904, 906 (1920). The New York Practice Act of 1920 itself was a marked improvement on the
complexity of New York practice-a code of procedure with 3,383 sections-that existed before
its enactment. Id.
3. See Alexander Holtzoff, Origin and Sources of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1057, 1057 (1955); Charles E. Clark, ProceduralReform and the Supreme Court,
AM. MERCURY, Aug. 1926, at 445, 447 (complaining about this state of affairs).
4. For the argument that the surface simplicity of the Federal Rules has engendered complexity, see, for example, Stephen B. Burbank, The Complexity of Modern American Civil Litigation:
Curse or Cure?, 91 JUDICATURE 163, 164 (2008).
5. In 2004, a total of 281,338 civil cases were filed in the federal courts, and in 2005 the number was 253,273. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS: 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECrOR 48 (2008). In contrast, in Fiscal Year
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What Robert Cover called their "trans-substantive achievement"the notion that the Federal Rules apply equally to all areas of substantive legal doctrine-is one of the keys to the simplicity intended by
their 1938 authors. 6 The trans-substantivity principle reduces com-

plexity for a straightforward reason. It requires that the procedural
treatment that the Federal Rules prescribe for simple contracts disputes mirrors exactly what applies in complicated employment discrimination litigation. Judges and lawyers do not need to relearn
procedure every time they delve into a new field of substantive

doctrine.
Trans-substantivity and the simplicity it engenders have a certain
aesthetic appeal, 7 but while perhaps appropriate in 1938, they may not
suit the complexity of the twenty-first century legal world. The Federal Rules have drawn critical fire as a relic of a kinder, gentler era in
American civil justice that anachronistically encumbers modern litigation. Perhaps indicative of the principle's centrality to the Federal
Rules, these general assaults routinely include an attack on trans-substantivity. 8 The notion that the same procedural rules could and
should apply regardless of the substance of the case does, at first
blush, seem quaint.9 The 1938 authors likely did not foresee the asbestos leviathan, class actions with up to 100 million plaintiffs, 10 or
other enormously complicated fields of litigation that beg for specialized procedural treatment. Legal practice has evolved since 1938; lawyers focus their practices on increasingly minute areas of law,1 1 and
2004-2005, a total of 182,468 unlimited civil actions were filed in California courts.

JUDICIAL

25 (2006).
6. Robert M. Cover, For James Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84
YALE L.J. 718, 718 (1975); see also Judith Resnik, For Owen M. Fiss: Some Reflections on the
Triumph and the Death of Adjudication, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 173, 177 (2003) ("The drafters [of
the 1938 rules] created a trans-substantive code to simplify process .... ").
7. See generally Janice Toran, 'Tis a Gift to Be Simple: Aesthetics and ProceduralReform, 89
MICH. L. REV. 352, 371-86 (1990).
8. See, e.g., Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The Revolution of 1938 and Its Discontents, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 275, 292-93 (2008); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith:Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 526-27 (1986). For critical commentary on transsubstantivity specifically, see infra note 25 (citing articles).
9. See Resnik, supra note 8, at 508-15 (offering a view of civil litigation in the 1930s); Stephen
N. Subrin, Uniformity in ProceduralRules and the Attributes of a Sound ProceduralSystem: The
Case for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79, 84 (1997) (finding it "unlikely in the extreme
that [today] a relatively small group of lawyers, many of whom knew each other in advance,
could sit in a room and create an entirely new procedure for the entire country as was the case in
the 1930s").
10. E.g., Lynn Mather, Theorizing About Trial Courts: Lawyers, Policymaking, and Tobacco
Litigation, 23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 897, 910 (1998) (describing tobacco class action litigation).
11. See generally Michael Ariens, Know the Law: A History of Legal Specialization,45 S.C. L.
COUNCIL OF CAL., PROGRESS THROUGH UNrIY: WORKING TOWARD COMMON GOALS

REV. 1003 (1994).
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even supposedly generalist judges specialize. 12 Why should a onesize-fits-all set of procedural rules persist? If certain areas of law are
sufficiently complex to demand specialized practitioners, should they
not also require specialized, substance-specific procedures?
The pressures of complexity and specialization, among other developments, have imperiled the trans-substantivity principle as a bulwark
of federal civil procedure. For years, lower federal courts have chafed
against its constraints, trying to read substance-specific requirements
into the open texture of the Federal Rules. 13 In the past decade, legislatures have enacted tailored rules for particular doctrinal areas. 14
Prominent commentators have floated proposals for substance-spe15
cific procedural rules.
Trans-substantivity seems poised to depart from the center of the
procedural stage. Before this exit, however, the story of where the
principle came from in the first place needs telling. Although others
have touched on various aspects, no one has yet offered a historical
treatment of trans-substantivity's development.1 6 This Article offers a
version, and in doing so, it identifies the theoretical underpinnings
long associated with trans-substantivity that should have implications
for procedural rulemaking in the future. Why and how the principle
developed illuminates some basic foundational assumptions of American civil procedure.' 7 The story also reveals what changes substancespecific procedural rules might require for the processes by which
such rules are promulgated and judicially constructed.
12. See generally Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the GeneralistJudge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519
(2008).
13. See Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 567-90 (2002)
(describing efforts by lower courts to forge substance-specific pleading requirements).

14. See infra notes 205-233 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion:The Supreme Court, FederalRules
and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 716-17 (1988); Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge

Pointsand Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure,
46 FLA. L. REV. 27, 45-56 (1994).
16. Stephen Subrin and Robert Bone have touched on various aspects of the history of transsubstantivity but have not addressed the subject comprehensively. See Robert G. Bone, The
Processof Making Process: Court Rulemaking, DemocraticLegitimacy, and ProceduralEfficacy,

87 GEO. L.J. 887, 893-97 (1999); Stephen N. Subrin, FederalRules, Local Rules, and State Rules:
Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2002-10
(1989). Stephen Burbank has thoroughly addressed the substance-procedure dichotomy but has
not provided a historical treatment of the principle itself. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules

Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982).
17. For a different description of the "foundational assumptions" of "modem American procedure," see Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of "GeneralRules", 2009 Wis. L.
REV. 535, 536.
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After an introduction to trans-substantivity in Part 11,18 Part III
traces the rise of the principle in American law. 19 It begins with the
substance-specific procedural system of the common law era, 20 describes the entrenchment of trans-substantivity with the code reforms
of the nineteenth century, 21 and depicts its final triumph with the Federal Rules of 1938.22 A prominent theme of this history is the tight
link between the emergence in legal thought of a dichotomy between
substance and procedure, and a preference for trans-substantive procedural rules. Only after lawyers acquired the ability to conceive of
substantive doctrine apart from procedural form could procedural reformers argue for rules to apply equally regardless of substance. One
might fairly describe this substance-procedure dichotomy as the jurisprudential prerequisite for the development of trans-substantivity.
Also, procedural reformers consistently voiced a claim-the only
purpose of procedure qua procedure is to facilitate the efficient resolution of cases on their substantive merits-as they argued for transsubstantive rules. To early advocates of the principle, this normative
assumption was an implication of trans-substantivity, given its indifference to substantive policy. Finally, because trans-substantive rules derived their goals from the substantive law they implemented, their
promulgation was value-neutral and could legitimately proceed
outside the political process. Trans-substantivity accordingly played a
key theoretical role in justifying the sort of court-supervised rulemaking that produced the Federal Rules of 1938.
Part IV describes the ways in which recent statutory developments
have imperiled trans-substantivity as a central plank in the foundation
of American civil procedure. 23 Most prominently, legislatures have
enacted mixed packages of procedural and substantive reforms, including particularized pleading rules for medical malpractice, securities, and prisoner litigation. The embrace of substance-specific
procedure highlights the brittleness of trans-substantivity's theoretical
underpinnings. An insistence on a dichotomy between substance and
procedure rings hollow when legislatures use procedural and substantive measures as functionally indistinguishable tools to pursue an undivided set of policy goals. The claim that procedural rules exist
simply to facilitate the resolution of cases on their substantive merits
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes

25-47 and accompanying text.
48-192 and accompanying text.
49-63 and accompanying text.
64-126 and accompanying text.
127-192 and accompanying text.
205-233 and accompanying text.
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fails when legislatures use these tools to directly implement substantive ends. The very politicized processes that generated these procedural reforms undercut any notion that procedural reform is a valueneutral pursuit.
But the decline of trans-substantivity in recent decades is not simply
the story of a principle in its senescence. Even as the theoretical underpinnings of trans-substantivity weaken, institutions with rulemaking power manifest by their actions continued respect for the
principle. As Part IV describes, authoritative rulemakers within the
federal system-the Supreme Court, the Advisory Committee, and
federal districts in their exercise of local rulemaking power-have restricted themselves to the promulgation of trans-substantive rules or
the trans-substantive construction of procedural rules. 24 The contrast
with the legislative turn to substance-specific procedure makes the reticence of these actors all the more interesting. A message lurks in this
juxtaposition: court-supervised rulemaking remains legitimate if it
generates trans-substantive rules, but substance-specific rules must
come from the political process. Even if it is theoretically bereft,
trans-substantivity continues to function as a principle that allocates
rulemaking power among various institutions.
If trans-substantivity has a future, it is as this: a principle of institutional allocation of rulemaking power. The point here is not to offer a
normative defense of trans-substantivity on its own merits, but rather
to find in it a legal process value that is worth defending. By operating as an institutional restraint on court-supervised rulemakers, the
principle can strengthen their legitimacy to craft procedural rules. As
argued in Part V, trans-substantivity is functionally useful as a tool to
achieve this good result.
II.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANS-SUBSTANTIVITY

PRINCIPLE

Although trans-substantivity has attracted quite a lot of comment, 25 it has enjoyed little systematic theoretical or historical treat24. See infra notes 235-273 and accompanying text.
25. A nonexhaustive list of significant discussions of trans-substantivity includes: Stephen B.
Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure:The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 1925, 1934-41 (1989); Burbank, supra note 15, at 715-18; Paul D. Carrington, Making
Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-TransSubstantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067 (1989); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,137 U. PA.
L. REV. 2237, 2244-47 (1989); Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for
ProceduralProgress, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 761, 776-79 (1993); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 841
(1991); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Halting Devolution or Bleak to the Future: Subrin's New-Old Proce-
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ment. 26 This Part sets up the history of trans-substantivity by describ-

ing what exactly the principle is. Particularly important to the
evolution of trans-substantivity as a historical matter is the relationship between procedural reform and value choice in law. This Part
lays the groundwork to support procedural reformers' claim, as described in Part III, that trans-substantive rules are value-neutral.
A.

The Contours of Trans-Substantivity

A procedural rule is trans-substantive if it applies equally to all
cases regardless of substance. A substance-specific procedural rule, in

contrast, requires specific processes for a particular substantive category of case. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules, which provides that "a
pleading ... must contain ... a short and plain statement of the claim
27
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," is trans-substantive.

In contrast, a provision in Rule 26 that exempts "an action by the
United States to collect on a student loan" from the mandatory initial

disclosures requirement is substance-specific.
the Federal
29
exceptions.

Rules

are

trans-substantive,

28

The vast majority of
with

a

few minor

Despite this apparent simplicity, trans-substantivity has engendered
some confusion in discussions of the general principles undergirding
modern federal civil procedure. First, trans-substantivity differs from

uniformity-an entirely different principle for the design of procedural rules. 30 Uniformity in procedure has several possible meanings.
As a geographical matter, a procedural system is uniform when the
same rules apply in all jurisdictions. Procedural rules can be uniform
but substance-specific (all jurisdictions must exempt student loan

cases from the mandatory initial disclosure requirement, for example)
or disuniform but trans-substantive (each jurisdiction can decide
dure As a Possible Antidote to Dreyfuss's "Tolstoy Problem", 46 FLA. L. REV. 57, 78-97 (1994);
Subrin, supra note 15, at 45-56; Subrin, supra note 16; Carl Tobias, The Transformationof TransSubstantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501 (1992); Mark C. Weber, The FederalCivil Rules
Amendments of 1993 and Complex Litigation: A Comment on Transsubstantivity and Special
Rules for Large and Small Federal Cases, 14 REV. LrnG. 113 (1994). A recent contribution is
Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the "War on Terror", 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013
(2008).
26. Important exceptions are Robert G. Bone, Securing the Normative Foundationsof Litigation Reform, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1155 (2006); Jay Tidmarsh, UnattainableJustice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits of Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683 (1992).
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
28. FED. R. Ov. P. 26(a)(1)(B)(vii).
29. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 71.1.
30. Cf. Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity in ProceduralRules and the Attributes of a Sound Procedural System: The Case for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79, 79-80 (1997) (using the
term "uniformity" differently than here).

2010]

TRANS-S UBSTANTIVITY

whether to allow telephonic depositions, for example). Several commentators have suggested a causal link between the prerogative of
federal districts to enact local rules-a power that fosters disuniformity, to be sure-and the erosion of trans-substantivity in the
federal procedural system. 3 1 Certainly this prerogative can contribute
to a breakdown in trans-substantivity because it gives federal districts
32
the room to promulgate substance-specific local rules if they wish.
But as the discussion of local rules in Part IV suggests, nothing neces33
sarily links disuniformity with substance-specificity.
A procedural system is also uniform when the same rules apply regardless of the size or complexity of a case. In this sense, a system
would be disuniform if, for example, one set of deposition rules applied to class actions, while another applied to individual suits. This
hypothetical system would nonetheless remain trans-substantive, provided that the same deposition rules applied regardless of the sub34
stance of the class action.
Second, the relationship between trans-substantive rules and rules
that vest procedural discretion in individual judges needs clarification.35 A number of commentators, generally critical of trans-substantivity, argue that the vast discretion the Federal Rules give district
judges renders the federal system only superficially trans-substantive.3 6 For example, a judge who thought that civil rights litigation
was a waste of time could, consistent with the Federal Rules, regularly
limit § 1983 plaintiffs to ten depositions but allow antitrust litigants
37
more.
31. See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, Civil Procedure: The Last Ten Years, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 503, 510
(1996) (eliding "uniformity" with "trans-substantivity" and arguing that the proliferation of local
rules after the enactment of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 eroded both); Tobias, supra
note 25, at 1504 (arguing that "the proliferation of local rules . . . has undone transsubstantivity").
32. See, e.g., Local Rules for the United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern
Districts of New York, Rule 33.2 ("Standard Discovery in Prisoner Pro Se Actions"); see also
Subrin, supra note 16, at 2025-26 (describing non-trans-substantive local rules).
33. See infra notes 267-272 and accompanying text.
34. But see Resnik, supra note 8, at 526-27 (suggesting that the evolution of a "distinct set of
rules for cases with multiple parties or complex issues" has "undermined" trans-substantivity in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
35. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1474 (1987)
(reviewing RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LrTGATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE (1985)) ("[Ilt is important to distinguish between

procedure that is tailored to the case, in the sense that it is ad hoc, and procedure crafted in
advance for a type of case.").
36. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 35, at 1474; Burbank, supra note 15, at 715; Resnik, supra
note 8,at 527; Tidmarsh, supra note 26, at 1747-48.
37. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2) (requiring leave of court for a party to take more than ten
depositions). Several commentators have invoked the Manual for Complex Litigation, which
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This claim, that the trans-substantivity of the federal system is illusory because of judicial discretion, sweeps a bit broadly in its criticism
of the principle. Ad hoc substance-specific procedures that an individual judge might employ differ significantly from a system-wide commitment to substance-specificity, as might be expressed in a
substance-specific rule that binds the hands of all judges. A civil rights
plaintiff might suffer because the discretionary Federal Rules enable
the judge who is assigned to her case to restrict her access to discovery. But a different civil rights plaintiff, who draws a more sympathetic judge, would benefit from the Federal Rules' open texture. In
other words, nothing in the discretion that the Federal Rules provide
manifests a systemic approval or disapproval of a particular substantive area of litigation. 38 In contrast, an expressly substance-specific
rule implies a blanket policy assessment as to the desirability of a particular type of litigation that all judges must respect, regardless of individual proclivity.
Third, procedural rules do not easily fit into either trans-substantive
or substance-specific pigeonholes. Because procedural rules can have
regular, predictable impacts that differ by substantive area of litigation, trans-substantivity and substance-specificity are ideal types at
two ends of a spectrum. But this fact does not render the labels useless. Arizona law requires a plaintiff suing a "health care professional" to state in her complaint whether an expert opinion will be
necessary to establish the defendant's liability. 39 Although by its
terms it would apply to a breach of contract or antitrust claim against
a physician, the requirement of course would overwhelmingly impact
medical malpractice cases. It has only a veneer of trans-substantivity
40
and is substance-specific by design.
The 1983 amendments to Rule 11 fall closer to, but still apart from,
the trans-substantivity end of the spectrum. Among other things, the
suggests procedural strategies for the management of particular types of complex cases, in order
to illustrate how the open texture of the Federal Rules enables individual judges to approach
cases in substance-specific ways. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 8, at 527; Tobias, supra note 25, at
1505 (arguing that the Manual for Complex Litigation "is a monument to non-transsubstantivity").
38. As far as the Manualfor Complex Litigation is concerned, the existence of trans-substantive rules of course does not mean that certain types of cases will present recurring procedural
challenges or that these challenges will differ by substantive category. It is one thing to have
useful advice spelled out in advance for how to handle these challenges; it would be another
thing altogether if the Manual were binding and thereby required judges to handle antitrust or
securities class actions in particular ways in all instances.
39. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2603 (2008).
40. See Kay M. Cooper, Medical Malpractice: The Prognosis, ARIz. A-r'y, Feb. 2007, at 17,
20.
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amended Rule 11 required a plaintiff's lawyer to certify that allegations in a complaint are "well grounded in fact" and did not permit a
good faith defense to the threat of sanctions.4 1 While nominally transsubstantive, this rule change had a particularly dramatic impact in Title VII and other civil rights cases. 42 A number of recurring features
of this type of litigation-the fact that evidence of discrimination is
often in the defendant's control, for example, and the well-known financial straits of civil rights practitioners 3-made this so. But in contrast to the Arizona pleading requirement, this substance-specific
effect did not motivate the design of the nominally trans-substantive
rule. Part V discusses the implications of this difference.
B.

Value-Neutrality and Trans-Substantivity

A particularly important, if controvertible, feature of trans-substantive rules is their neutrality with respect to substantive policy. Rules
designed to apply equally across doctrinal categories require a level of
abstraction that prevent them from explicitly expressing or manifesting a judgment as to the value of one area or another of substantive
law. To the pioneers of the principle, as explained in Part III, this
result meant that trans-substantive rules were value-neutral.
This perception of value-neutrality depends on an understanding
that restricts value to policy choices made in substantive law. This
notion of value of course is quite restrictive. A choice of one transsubstantive procedural rule over another, even if made for reasons
totally disconnected from any particular substantive policy preference,
can significantly impact the enjoyment of rights and the discharge of
duties.44 A rulemaker might prefer a heightened pleading standard
over a minimal one if she believes that efficiency, defined as optimal
system-wide costs of litigation, should temper easy access to courts.
The choice would help determine who can try to vindicate their claims
and under what conditions, and thus have a significant impact on public policy. By a more expansive notion of value, this preference is
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (Advisory Committee's Note to 1983 amendments).
42. See generally Phyllis Tropper Baumann et al., Substance in the Shadow of Procedure: The
Integration of Substantive and ProceduralLaw in Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L. REV. 211, 289-96
(1992) (describing the impact of the 1983 version of Rule 11 on Title VII cases); Mark Spiegel,
The Rule 11 Studies and Civil Rights Cases:An Inquiry into the Neutrality of ProceduralRules, 32
CONN. L. REV. 155 (1999) (arguing that the 1983 and 1993 versions of Rule 11 had a disproportionate impact in civil rights cases); Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BuFF. L.
REV. 485, 489-508 (1989) (noting the adverse effect of the 1983 Rule 11 amendments on civil
rights plaintiffs).
43. See Baumann et al., supra note 42, at 289-90.
44. See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Procedure,67 A.B.A. J. 1648,
1651 (1981).
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quite value-laden. Indeed, the claim that procedural rules should
serve all doctrinal categories equally itself involves a value choice because it implies a commitment to the idea that all substantive areas
45
merit the same amount and type of procedural implementation.
At the least, however, trans-substantive procedural rules can claim
a type of value-neutrality that substance-specific rules lack. Alas, it
becomes necessary here to provide some definitional distinction between substance and procedure. It is impossible to do so in a way that
will prove remotely satisfying to the legions of lawyers, judges, and
scholars who have grappled with this issue, so the distinction here is
offered tentatively for the sake of the argument that follows. A law is
procedural if in design and effect it regulates the efficiency or accuracy
of litigation. To borrow a famous and venerable definition, a law is
substantive if in design and effect it "characteristically and reasonably
affect[s] people's conduct at the stage of primary private activity. '46
If value is defined as a choice of substantive policy, a law is valueneutral if it does not directly regulate conduct "at the stage of primary
private activity." By providing particularized procedural requirements for different areas of substantive law, substance-specific rules
directly contribute to the achievement of particular regulatory goals
for individuals' primary activity. The preference or burden they foist
upon a particular area of substantive policy thus precludes value-neutrality. The generality of trans-substantive rules, however, does not
permit such a direct connection between process and substantive end.
By this admittedly restrictive but (one hopes) analytically useful understanding of value, trans-substantive rules are indeed valueneutral.

III.

47

THE RISE OF TRANS-SUBSTANTIVE

CIVIL PROCEDURE

This Part tells the story of trans-substantivity's rise, starting with
common law pleading, proceeding through the code reforms of the
nineteenth century, and ending with the Federal Rules of 1938. Three
themes emerge. First, the principle developed in lockstep with the
emergence of a dichotomy between substantive and procedural law.
This connection is logical. Trans-substantivity by definition requires
45. Cf Bone, supra note 26, at 1163 (arguing that the only way to evaluate the "social benefit
of procedure" is to assess the value of the substantive interests the procedure addresses).
46. RICHARD H.

FALLON JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND

THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 727 (4th ed. 1996) (quoting Herbert Wechsler and Henry Hart's definition of substantive law); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (essentially adopting Hart and Wechsler's definition).
47. For other discussions of value-neutrality in federal procedure, see Carrington, supra note
25, at 2074-79; Marcus, supra note 25, at 773-74, 781, 784.
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some analytical separation between substance and procedure. Procedural rules can only apply across doctrinal categories if these categories exist in some manner or another. Also, procedural rules must
stand apart from these doctrinal categories in order for the same rules
to function regardless of substantive setting. The substance-procedure
dichotomy could fairly be described as trans-substantivity's jurisprudential prerequisite.
Second, the major proponents of trans-substantivity shared a consistent normative assumption for the proper purpose of procedural rules:
they have no independent goals of their own and instead exist to pro48
vide for the efficient resolution of cases on their substantive merits.
Procedure, in other words, is only a means to an end, a machine of
sorts, and its goals in terms of public policy are entirely derivative of
choices made in substantive law. The concurrent development of
trans-substantivity with this assumption suggests that these proponents believed that the assumption was an implication of the principle,
and that the principle required the assumption.
These two themes of trans-substantivity's rise-its jurisprudential
prerequisite and the normative assumption that accompanies itdovetail to help explain a third theme: the understanding of procedural reform as value-neutral and the implications of this value-neutrality for court-supervised rulemaking. The substance-procedure
dichotomy enabled a distinction between procedural rulemaking and
substantive legislation. The claim that procedural rules derived their
goals entirely from substantive law strengthened the perception of
procedural reform as a value-neutral enterprise. Crucially, for the history of American civil procedure, procedural rulemaking for early
twentieth-century reformers could legitimately proceed outside the
political process because the promulgation of trans-substantive rules
involved no choice of substantive policy.
A.

Common Law: Substance-Specific Procedure

Every history of American civil procedure shares the same beginning: the system of common law pleading first developed in England
after the Norman invasion, and it was then transported across the Atlantic as a backbone of early American law. 4 9 The forms of action and
48. Procedural reformers shared an understanding of efficiency that was much more rudimentary than what a modern lawyer who is familiar with basic economic theory might read into the
term. For them, procedural rules were efficient when they worked quickly and inexpensively.
See Bone, supra note 16, at 895 & n.37.
49. See, e.g., Harold J. Berman & Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Transformation of English Legal
Science: From Hale to Blackstone, 45 EMORY L.J. 437, 509-10 (1996).
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their implementation through a system of writs gave common law
pleading its foundation. 50 Starting in the thirteenth century, a prospective litigant had to petition the Crown's chancellor for a writ, an
order directing the defendant to appear and giving the royal court jurisdiction.51 Various forms of action-assumpsit, detinue, trover, trespass, and a host of others-eventually coalesced out of the issuance of
similar writs under similar factual circumstances. 52 What modern lawyers would regard as a set of substance-specific procedural rules
evolved. 53 The various forms of action required the pleader to make
quite specific and technical allegations in his complaint that differed
depending on the remedy pursued.54 The processes that followed as a
case proceeded varied.5 5 The chosen form would determine the nature of the defendant's responsive pleading, 56 the requirements for
service of process, whether a court could enter a default judgment, the
form of trial, and the means of executing judgments. 57 General procedural rules did not exist, but to quote one seminal history of English
law, "[O]ne could discourse at great length about the mode in which
58
an action of this or that sort was to be pursued and defended."
This connection between procedure and substance reflected the
state of the common law's theoretical sophistication. Late nineteenthcentury lawyers denigrated the forms of action and the writ system of
pleading, which evolved haphazardly and without any overarching
50. See CLARK, supra note 1, at 14. See generally L.B. CURZON, ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY
73-82 (2d ed. 1979) (describing the forms of action at common law pleading); CHARLES A. KEIGWIN, CASES IN COMMON LAW PLEADING

1-13 (1924) (same);

ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR,

PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

CIVIL

17 (1952) (same).

51. CLARK, supra note 1, at 14.
52. Id. at 14-15.
53. See generally F.W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 2-4 (A.H.
Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1963).
54. See CHARLES M. HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING IN
AMERICA AND ENGLAND § 57, at 58-59 (1897); JOHN NORTON POMEROY, REMEDIES AND REMEDIAL RIGHTS BY THE CIVIL ACTION ACCORDING TO THE REFORMED AMERICAN PROCEDURE

§ 510, at 539 (1876).
55. See MAITLAND, supra note 53, at 6; see also J.H.

BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH

LEGAL HISTORY 52 (2d ed. 1979) ("Procedures and methods of trial available in an action com-

menced by one kind of writ were not necessarily available in another."); GEORGE VAN
SANTVOORD,A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS UNDER THE NEW
YORK CODE OF PROCEDURE 9 (1873) (observing that each form of action had "rules peculiar to

itself").
56. See William E. Nelson, The Reform of Common Law Pleading in Massachusetts
1760-1830: Adjudication As a Prelude to Legislation, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 100 (1973).
57. See 2 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 568 (2d ed. 1968); MAITLAND, supra note 53, at
2-3.
58. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 57, at 562.
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theoretical design,5 9 as a testament to a theoretically immature legal
system with no real structure. 60 This observation, although perhaps
exaggerated by the hyper-rationality of nineteenth-century legal science, has some truth. Doctrinal categories such as tort or contract did
not appear in the common law until the late eighteenth century at the
earliest. Before that time, lawyers did not think of substantive rights
per se, but rather conceived of them procedurally in terms of writs to
procure a particular remedy. 61 Only in the nineteenth century did
substantive doctrinal categories and a robust jurisprudential distinction between procedural rules and substantive rights and duties
emerge. 62 Before then, the forms of action provided the common law
with its organizational structure. 63 Trans-substantive procedural rules
must be disconnected from substantive law to apply across doctrinal
categories. Thus, their entanglement in the common law meant that,
as a jurisprudential matter, a trans-substantivity principle could not fit
within common law pleading.
B.
1.

The Rise of Trans-Substantivity

JurisprudentialBeginnings

The classification of the common law in Blackstone's Commentaries
in the late eighteenth century, and the early nineteenth-century stirrings of legal science with all its categorizing tendencies, laid the
groundwork for a substance-procedure dichotomy and thus trans-substantivity's jurisprudential prerequisite. 64 The entanglement of sub59. See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 57, at 568; POMEROY, supra note 54, § 26, at 24;
Charles E. Clark, Trial of Actions Under the Code, 11 CORNELL L.Q. 482, 483 (1926); Book
Review, 5 Am. L. REV. 359, 359 (1871) (reviewing JOHN TOWNSHEND, THE CODE OF PROCEDURE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, As AMENDED TO 1870 (1871)) (noting that the forms of

action "owe[d] their origin to... purely historical causes" and were not "based upon a comprehensive survey of the field of rights and duties").
60. See POMEROY, supra note 54, § 26, at 24.
61. See, e.g., J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 49 (2d ed. 1979);
A CONCISE LEGAL HISTORY 1 (1921); HEPBURN, supra note 54, § 21, at
21-22; MILLAR, supra note 50, at 3-4; POMEROY, supra note 54, § 24, at 21; HAROLD POI-ER,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 82 (1923).
62. See JOHN W. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE OR THE THEORY OF THE LAW § 32, at 84 (2d ed.
1907); Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1225, 1231 n.10 (2001); Duncan
EDGAR HAMMOND,

Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BuFF. L. REV. 209, 231-32 (1979);
Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field:A History, 27 REV. LITIG. 161, 175-76 (2008).
63. See POMEROY, supra note 54, § 25, at 23; G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW INAMERICA: AN
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 9 (1980); Stephen M. Feldman, From Premodern to Modern American

Jurisprudence:The Onset of Positivism, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1411-13 (1997); A.W.B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principlesand the Forms of Legal Literature,
48 U. CHI. L. REV. 632, 638-39 (1981).
64. Charles Clark noted the significance of Blackstone in this regard by declaring in his Handbook of Code Pleading that Blackstone "apotheosized" English common law. CLARK, supra
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stance with procedure, however, persisted well into the 1800s. The
newly emerging American treatise literature of the time illustrates this
transitional state of affairs. 65 Joseph Chitty organized his 1826 con-

tracts treatise without recourse to the forms of action, 66 and James
Gould published a treatise on pleading in 1832 that approached the
subject as its own discipline. 67 On the other hand, Nathan Dane's
eight volume GeneralAbridgement and Digest of American Law, published from 1823 to 1829, used the forms of action as a structural guide
68
to the common law.
The jurisprudential boundary between substance and procedure
owes its first analytically precise articulation to Jeremy Bentham, the

progenitor of the term "procedure" itself. 69 Bentham stressed the

purpose each plays in the maximization of utility as he distinguished
between the two. Substantive law included all doctrine that regulated
rights and duties, with its end being "the maximization of the happi-

ness of the greatest number of the members of the community in
question. ' 70 Bentham defined "procedure" or "adjective law" as "the
course taken for the execution of the laws,.., for the accomplishment
of the will declared, or supposed to be declared, by them in each
71
instance. "

note 1, at 17. For a discussion of Blackstone and the separation of substance from procedure,
see John H. Langbein, Introduction to 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND iii,
iii (Univ. of Chi. 1979) (1768); Kennedy, supra note 62, at 233; Thomas 0.

Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 459-64 (2003);
Alan Watson, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries,97 YALE L.J. 795, 804-05, 810 (1988).
For a discussion of the rise of legal science in the early nineteenth century and its significance for
the substance-procedure dichotomy, see 3-4 G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND

CULTURAL CHANGE 1815-35, at 81 (1988); Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Writs to Rights: "Navigability"
and the Transformation of the Common Law in the Nineteenth Century, 23 CARDOZO L. REV.
1049, 1053 (2002).
65. See Simpson, supra note 63, 668-70.

66. See JOSEPH CHITrY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS ix-xv (1826).
67. See JAMES GOULD, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS
(1832).
68. See NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 22-63
(1823) (organizing the table of contents around common law writs).
69. See JEREMY BEN-I-HAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL 142 n.k (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1970) (1782); see

also Albert Kocourek, Substance and Procedure,10 FORDHAM L. REV. 157, 157 (1941) (crediting
Bentham with first distinguishing between substantive and "adjective" law); D. Michael Risinger, "Substance" and "Procedure" Revisited with Some Afterthoughts on the Constitutional
Problems of "Irrebutable Presumptions", 30 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 189, 191-92 (1982) (describing
Bentham's distinction between substance and procedure).

70. JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of Judicial Procedure,in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 5, 6 (John Bowring ed., 1843); see also Grey, supra note 62, at 1242 (describing Bentham's
view of substantive law).
71. BENTHAM, supra note 70, at 5.

2010]

TRANS-SUBSTANTIVITY

Procedure did not directly contribute to overall happiness because,
by definition, it simply provided the avenue for the implementation of
the substantive law. But by ensuring "the maximization of the execution and effect given to the substantive branch of the law," it could do
so indirectly. Hence, the "primary," albeit entirely derivative, goal of
procedural rules: "the execution of the commands issued, the fulfillment of the predictions delivered, of the engagements taken, by the
system of substantive law." 72 This meant, in William Twining's summary, "[R]ectitude of decision, that is the correct application of substantive law to reliably determined facts."' 73 Bentham recognized that
"in the pursuit" of this primary goal, "a variety of inconveniences are
apt to occur."' 74 Litigation can prove expensive and burdensome and
thereby detract from overall happiness. Hence, as a "collateral" or
"subordinate" goal, procedural rules should try to "minimiz[e] the
evil, the hardship, in various possible shapes necessary to the accom'75
plishment of the main specified end."
Put together, the purpose of procedure is simple: efficiently facilitate the resolution of cases on their substantive merits. Thus, procedure is only "a means to an end."' 76 Any treatment of procedural rules
that afforded them some other purpose was illegitimate because it interfered with the maximization of happiness through the substantive
law.

77

The trans-substantivity principle lurks in Bentham's distinction between substance and procedure. By definition, procedural rules lack
any doctrinal vestments and are thus substance-neutral. This, Bentham believed, is how it should be. Substance-specific procedural
rules engender complexity, which would only give judges and lawyers
an excuse to enrich themselves needlessly at the expense of overall
utility. 78 Bentham offered an anthropology of sorts of dispute resolution, and he believed that something akin to the formless process by
which families solved problems worked most efficiently and accurately. 79 Litigation should be modeled on this simple process. Properly conceived, Bentham maintained, "The means for coming at the
72. 4

JEREMY BENTHAM,

GLISH PRACTICE

73.

RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, SPECIALLY APPLIED TO EN-

477 (1827).

WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 48

(1985).

74. BENTHAM, supra note 70, at 6.

75. Id. at 8.
76. BENTHAM, supra note 72, at 477.

77. See

TWINING,

supra note 73, at 91.

78. See JEREMY BENTHAM, Scotch Reform, in 5 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1, 3, 5-6

(John Bowring ed., 1843) (1808).
79. See GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM

AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION

346 (1986).
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truth, as to matters of fact, are the same in all cases: the means for
obtaining and exercising the powers necessary to the giving execution
and effect to the ordinances of substantive law, are the same in all
cases."so
Bentham's definitions of substance and procedure syncs with the
sharp distinction that he drew between legislative and judicial functions. "[N]othing," he argued, "can be of greater importance than
that the provinces of the Judge and the Legislature should be kept
distinct." 81 For several reasons, including fear of upsetting settled expectations as to rights and duties, he argues that judges should not
make substantive law, but rather implement legislative will strictly and
adhere to stare decisis rigidly. 82 In contrast, Bentham advocated
open-ended procedural rules-to be applied with ample discretion by
the judge on a case-by-case basis-as best suited for the efficient implementation of substantive doctrine. 83 The entirely derivative purpose that he assigned procedural rules gives normative support to this
distinction. Judges could control procedure because its application
did not entail the choice to privilege any particular rights or duties but
merely involved the implementation of legislative will. Procedure, in
84
this sense, was value-neutral.
2.

The Development of Trans-Substantivity in the United States

After Bentham, the story continues in the United States. By the
middle of the nineteenth century, the vanguard of American civil procedure had become nominally trans-substantive. The same three
themes that resonated in Bentham's thought-the substance-procedure dichotomy, the normative assumption about the purpose of procedure, and procedure's value-neutrality-accompanied the
principle's American emergence.
80. BENTHAM, supra note 70, at 15. Although Bentham allowed that there might be some
substance-specific procedural rules, he insisted that the great weight of adjective law should be
the same regardless of the substantive law at issue. See Gerald J. Postema, The Principle of
Utility and the Law of Procedure:Bentham's Theory of Adjudication, 11 GA. L. REV. 1393, 1401
(1977).
81. POSTEMA, supra note 79, at 197.

82. See id. at 198-201, 209.
83. See MICHAEL LOBBAN, THE COMMON LAW AND ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 1760-1850, at
129 (1991).
84. Cf. Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., "There'll Always Be an England": The Instrumental Ideology
of Evidence, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1204, 1213 (1987) (reviewing WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF
EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE (1985)) (describing the apolitical nature of procedure for

Bentham).
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Progress began with the first American legal code-Edward Living-

ston's code of procedure of 1805.85 Significantly influenced by Bentham, 86 Livingston eschewed the common law forms of action and the
procedural complexities they fostered for a simplified procedure. To
plead a claim, his code required plaintiffs in all cases to simply "state
the names of the parties, their places of residence, and the cause of
action, with the necessary circumstances of places and dates. '87 As

Livingston wrote to Bentham, he intended his code to "reject[ ] ...
the common law procedure in civil suits" and offer in its stead a "simple system" that a student could master in a day of study. 88

The fact that Louisiana, of all American jurisdictions, was the first
to adopt a trans-substantive procedural code itself illustrates the prin-

ciple's jurisprudential dependence on the substance-procedure dichotomy. Louisiana was not a common law jurisdiction and thus did not
inherit a system of law structured around procedural form. 89 Moreover, substance disentangled itself from procedure much earlier in civilian systems. 90
Much to the frustration of some lawyers of the time, 91 common law

pleading persisted elsewhere in the United States in the first half of
85. See Gerald Leonard, Towards a Legal History of American Criminal Theory: Culture and
Doctrine from Blackstone to the Model Penal Code, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 691, 760 (2003).
86. See FRANCIS R. AUMANN, THE CHANGING AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: SOME SELECTED
123 (1940); PETER J. KING, UTILITARIAN JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICA: THE INFLUENCE

PHASES

OF BENTHAM AND AUSTIN ON AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

270-95 (1986).
87. Henry G. McMahon, The Case Against Fact Pleading in Louisiana, 13 LA. L.
377 (1953) (quoting Acts of the Territory of Orleans, ch. 26, § 1 (1805)).

REV.

369,

88. Letter from Edward Livingston to Jeremy Bentham (July 1, 1830), in 11 THE WORKS OF
52 (John Bowring ed., 1843); cf John H. Wigmore, Louisiana:The Story ofIts
Legal System, 1 S.L.Q. 1, 10 (1916) (observing that Livingston shared Bentham's "contempt for
the rubbish and the useless fictions that disfigured . . .the common law of England and the
United States").
89. Louisiana law in 1805 was largely Spanish in origin. See KING, supra note 86, at 270. In
1808, it adopted a civil code modeled on the Code Napoleon. See John H. Tucker, Source Books
of Louisiana Law, 6 TUL. L. REV. 280, 283 (1932).
90. See R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, EUROPEAN LAW IN THE PAST AND FUTURE 48-49 (2002).
91. See, e.g., STATE OF NEW YORK, FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND
PLEADINGS 139 (1848) ("No new action has been devised within the last three hundred years;
JEREMY BENTHAM

and the courts of law of republican New-York, in the nineteenth century, are administering justice, in the forms of the courts of monarchical England, in the sixteenth."); DAVID DUDLEY
FIELD, Third Report of the Practice Commission (Jan 30, 1849), in 1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS,
AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD

285, 287 (A.P. Sprague ed., 1884)

("Our society had outgrown the solemn forms which, conceived in remote ages, belonged to

monarchical institutions."); see also Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code:
A Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311, 322 (1988)
(describing antebellum New York lawyers' frustration with pre-code procedure).
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the nineteenth century. 92 The forms of action, many of which had coalesced in a fourteenth-century, feudal, agrarian society, proved ill-

suited for the rapidly developing legal needs of an increasingly industrialized American economy. 93 The deficiencies of common law

pleading in this respect coincided with, and likely contributed to, the
emergence of a substance-procedure dichotomy. Driven by a need to
reconceptualize the common law for a nineteenth-century world and
encouraged by scientific theories of the day, 94 lawyers began to classify law into its familiar doctrinal categories. 95 At the same time, the

organizational structure that the forms of action provided the common law began to prove unnecessary, enabling the separation of substance from procedure.
These developments reached their zenith with the New York Code
of Procedure, authored in significant measure by David Dudley Field
and adopted in 1848.96 Influenced by Livingston's code, 97 the Field
Code has justly earned significant comment as a fountainhead of modern American civil procedure. 98 In addition to the abolition of the
distinction between law and equity, its key reforms included an end to
the forms of action. Rather than selecting a particular writ based on
the remedy sought, a plaintiff merely had to state all facts constituting
a "cause of action" in order to successfully plead his claim. Also, the
Field Code established a single mode of procedure for all cases. 99
92. Some jurisdictions-particularly Massachusetts and Georgia-began to depart from the
forms of action in an effort to modernize their procedural systems. See MILLAR, supra note 50,
at 40; William E. Nelson, The Reform of Common Law Pleading in Massachusetts 1760-1830:
Adjudication As a Prelude to Legislation, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 110-16 (1973).
93. See Subrin, supra note 91, at 322. On the rapid change in the American common law in
the first half of the nineteenth century, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 26, 99-100 (1977).
94. See generally Howard Schweber, The "Science" of Legal Science: The Model of the Natural
Sciences in Nineteenth-Century American Legal Education, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 421 (1999)
(describing the influence of natural science understandings in legal thought in the nineteenth
century).
95. See Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise, 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70, 83-87 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983).
96. For a comprehensive history of the Field Code, see generally Subrin, supra note 91.
97. See, e.g., DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, What Shall Be Done with the Practice of the Courts?,
reprintedin 1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD,
supra note 91, at 226, 242; ARPHAXED LOOMIS, HISTORIC SKETCH OF THE NEW YORK SYSTEM
OF LAW REFORM IN PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS 15 (1879) (observing that the New York Commissioners reviewed Livingston's code as an example when drafting the New York code).

98. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, Code Pleading and Practice Today, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD
CENTENARY ESSAYS 55, 55 (Alison Reppy ed., 1949).
99. CLARK, supra note 1, at 22-23; MILLAR, supra note 50, at 53-54.
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Trans-substantivity thus appears as a central feature in what became
known by the late 1800s as the "American system" of procedure. 10 0
Field embraced trans-substantivity as a foundational principle for
procedure. 10 1 In an 1847 polemic on procedural reform, he lamented
"the net of forms" that had "entangled" justice. 102 Doing better
meant starting over. Field recommended that lawyers "go back to
first principles, break up the present system, and reconstruct a simple
and natural scheme of legal procedure. 1 0 3 A fundamental tenet of
this new scheme, he insisted, must be "nothing less than a uniform
course of proceeding, in all cases."'t 0 4 Field defined "uniform course"
as
a general conformity in the different cases, so that, while the particular circumstances of each may receive such remedy as they require,
the outline of the proceedings in all may be the same, and a knowledge of10 5the course pursued in one may serve as a guide in the
others.
Field made the same normative assumption for procedural rules as
Bentham did-that their purpose was the efficient implementation of
the substantive law. He related this purpose to trans-substantivity.
Substance-specific rules created complexity, which interfered with this
implementation.10 6 Field also had the jurisprudential sophistication to
conceptualize a substance-procedure dichotomy, as evidenced by his
advocacy for a substantive civil code apart from his procedural one.
But Field's 1847 polemic suggests that the dichotomy had not yet become accepted wisdom. His desire for a procedural code needed the
political support of the New York bar. Field realized, however, that
the lawyers he had to win over might object to a simplified procedural
100. See, e.g., POMEROY, supra note 54, § 30, at 29; E.F. Johnson, The American (or Code)
System of Pleading,2 MICH. L.J. 376, 376 (1893); see also J. Newton Fiero, The Reformed Procedure-Its Advantages and Its Limitations, 4 AM. LAW. 251, 253 (1896).
101. See DAUN VAN EE, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE LAW 33
(1986) (referring to a "single method of proceeding" as "the essence" of Field's proposals); see
also Letter from David Dudley Field to Cephas Brainerd et al. (Feb. 20, 1878), in THE LATEST
EDITION OF THE NEW YORK CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN CEPHAS

28 (1878) (denouncing a proposed change
to the New York Code of Procedure because of its substance-specificity).
102. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, What Shall Be Done with the Practice of the Courts? (1847), reprinted in 1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD,
supra note 91, at 226, 228 [hereinafter FIELD, Practice of the Courts]; see also David Dudley
Field, Law Reform in the United States and Its Influence Abroad, 25 AM. L. REV. 515, 519 (1891)
(denouncing the "grotesque forms of action").
103. FIELD, Practiceof the Courts, supra note 102, at 226, 229.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 230.
106. See id. at 235; cf Subrin, supra note 91, at 318 (noting Field's frustration with the technicalities of common law pleading and the way they interfered with litigation).
BRAINERD AND OTHERS AND DAVID DUDLEY FIELD
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code on grounds that "the learning of the profession"-the substance
of the law itself-"[is] bound up with the system of common-law
pleading.' 10 7 As a response, Field staunchly asserted the independence of substantive law from procedure:
To assert that the great body of the law, civil and criminal-the law
which defines rights and punishes crimes; the law which regulates
the proprietorship, the enjoyment, and the transmission of property
in all its forms; which explains the nature and. the obligations of contracts through all their changes . . . to assert that this vast body of
law requires the aid of that small portion which regulates the written statement of the parties in the courts of common law, is to assert
a monstrous paradox, fitter for ridicule than for argument. 10 8
Field also insisted that his proposed procedural system would "not affect, in the slightest degree, the substantial rights of any party."' 0 9 In
other words, procedural reform, pursued the way Field envisioned it,
would be value-neutral with respect to substantive policy.
In one respect, Field differed from the other key figures in the development of trans-substantivity and what it meant for procedural
rulemaking. Like Bentham, Field advocated for a strict separation between the judicial and legislative functions. 110 Unlike Bentham, however, who believed judicial discretion appropriate in the procedural
realm, Field wanted to constrain judges with legislatively fixed procedural rules that eliminated such discretion. He would thus protect
against judicial adventurism in lawmaking."' In other words, to protect the legislative prerogative from judicial encroachment, Field denied judges control even over the rules that governed court processes.
Field's influence on American civil procedure in the second half of
the nineteenth century was enormous. By 1900, twenty-five states and
four territories had enacted a version of his code reforms, spreading
trans-substantivity across the American legal landscape.1 1 2 Commentary from the era reflects the tight link between the principle's en13
trenchment and a well-established substance-procedure dichotomy.
107. FIELD, Practice of the Courts, supra note 102, at 226, 249.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 251.
110. David Dudley Field, Codification, 20 Am. L. REV. 1, 2 (1886). Field, nonetheless, would
have allowed common lawmaking a limited role had New York adopted his proposed civil code.
See Lewis A. Grossman, Langdell Upside-Down: James Coolidge Carter and the Anticlassical
Jurisprudenceof Anticodification, 19 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 149, 166-70 (2007).
111. See Subrin, supra note 91, at 323.
112. See CLARK, supra note 1, at 24. The four territories were Arizona (1912 statehood),
Alaska (1959 statehood), Oklahoma (1907 statehood), and New Mexico (1912 statehood).
113. Late nineteenth-century commentators invoked the substance-procedure dichotomy as a
starting point for a discussion of procedure. See, e.g., EDWIN E. BRYANr, THE LAW OF PLEAD-
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14
John Norton Pomeroy, an important supporter of the code reforms,'
explicitly discussed the rise of trans-substantivity-a "single, harmoni-

ous, identical system" of procedure"15-as
11

a result of jurisprudential

6

maturation.
In earlier times, because "judges [did not] view the law
as a body of general rules based upon great principles of right and

justice,'1

17 procedural

form provided the common law with its organi-

zational structure. 118 According to Pomeroy, as nineteenth-century

lawyers "mould[ed] separate and important portions of the [common
law] into a logical, scientific, and homogenous form," 119 the forms of

action lost their structural importance,120 and their continued use
could only interfere with the implementation of the substantive law.
By abolishing the forms of action and substituting in their stead a "single judicial instrument for the prosecution of all remedial rights," the
American system of code pleading would better enable the legal sys1 21
tem to perform this function.
Lawyers continued to make the same normative assumption as to
the derivative purpose of procedural rules that Bentham and Field
voiced-the settlement of "controversies . . . quickly, inexpensively,
and as nearly right as possible."'1

22

Also, procedural reform did not

rights 123

alter substantive
and could thus claim the mantle of valueneutrality. The state of affairs for procedural reform at the end of the
nineteenth century thus reflects the entrenchment of trans-substantivity. By 1900, the lack of procedural uniformity across American jurisdictions124 and creeping particularism and complexity within code
ING UNDER THE CODES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1, at 1 (1894); HEPBURN, supra note 54, § 18, at

19.
114. For Pomeroy on the code reforms, see POMEROY, supra note 54, § 32, at 31. For a discussion of Pomeroy's importance as a proceduralist in general, see Robert G. Bone, Mapping the
Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 27 (1989).

115. POMEROY, supra note 54, § 34, at 32.
116. See, e.g., id. § 7, at 7.
117. Id. § 24, at 2. ...
118. See id. § 25, at 23 ("The division into legal and equitable relief, and the common-law
forms of action, presented a theoretical and a practical classification of remedies and remedial
rights, which was universally accepted as not only proper, but as the only one possible under the
circumstances.").
119. Id. § 24, at 22.
120. Id. § 37, at 37; see also Johnson, supra note 100, at 380 (observing that the abolition of the
forms left underlying rights unchanged).
121. POMEROY, supra note 54, § 33, at 32; see also id. § 37, at 37.
122. Fred A. Maynard, Reform in Legal Procedure,2 MICH. L.J. 75, 75 (1893).
123. See POMEROY, supra note 54, § 37, at 37.
124. As early as the 1870s, advocates proposed a national code of civil procedure. See, e.g.,
M.M. Cohn, A Uniform Code of Procedure, 7 CENT. L.J. 322, 324 (1878); Address of Mr. Justice
Miller, 18 ALB. L.J. 405,412 (1878); William Reynolds, A National Code of Procedure,21 AM. L.

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:371

jurisdictions 2 5 drew the focus of reformers. Substance-specificity entered into the conversation only implicitly, as part of debates over the
persistence in some jurisdictions of common law pleading and the con126
tinued resistance to code reforms.
C.

The FederalRules of 1938: Trans-Substantivity, Court-Supervised
Rulemaking, and Institutional Legitimacy

Although innovative in many respects, the Federal Rules of 1938
did nothing particularly novel with respect to the development of
trans-substantivity. 12 7 Rather, they represent the principle's final triumph, as they expunged remnants of a common law mentality that
had survived the code reforms. As far as trans-substantivity is concerned, the Federal Rules are significant for that reason alone. Also
important to the trans-substantivity story is their source. The Federal
Rules emerged from a court-supervised rulemaking process to which
the themes of the principle's rise, and thus the trans-substantivity principle itself, lent institutional legitimacy.
1.

The Federal Rules and the Final Triumph of Trans-Substantivity

Vestiges of the forms of action lingered in turn-of-the-century
pleading, even in jurisdictions that had adopted a version of the Field
Code, 128 in part due to the intransigence of lawyers who saw something jurisprudentially fundamental in them.1 29 The necessary link between procedural form and substantive rights, one lawyer argued in
REV. 195 (1887). The American Bar Association, at Field's behest, took up the cause in the
1880s. See REPORT OF THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 68-70 (1888); REPORT OF THE NINTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIA-

TION 75 (1886); see also Burbank, supra note 16, at 1043-45 (relating this history).

125. See, e.g., J. Newton Fiero, Should the Code of Civil ProcedureBe Revised, Condensed and
Simplified, 2 AM. LAW. 479, 480 (1894).

126. See, e.g., Asa Iglehart, Suggestions upon Code Revisions and Code Procedure,8 CENT.
L.J. 411, 411 (1879).

127. Cf

SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

20, 1935, at 6
(discussing the meaning of the term "general rules" in the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072,
but making no mention of trans-substantivity); Burbank, supra note 25, at 1934-35; Burbank,
supra note 15, at 713 n.140 (noting that the 1938 authors of the Federal Rules "assumed" that
they would pursue trans-substantive rules).
ON RULES, HELD IN THE FEDERAL BUILDING AT CHICAGO, THURSDAY, JUNE

128. See HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS § 10, at 15 (2d

ed. 1901) ("The dependence of code pleading upon the principles of the common-law system is
no longer a disputed or debatable point in American jurisprudence.").
129. See, e.g., CHARLES A. KEIGWIN, CASES IN CODE PLEADING 23-24, 221 (1926); SIMEON
NASH, PLEADING AND PRACTICE UNDER THE CIVIL CODE 3 (3d ed. 1864); Modern Reform in
Pleading,1 AM. L. REV. 631, 634 (1867).
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1912, rendered trans-substantive procedure impossible. 130 Others
agreed, for example, that while the code reforms abolished the requirement that plaintiffs lard their complaints with technical language,
the common law forms of action determined what facts a plaintiff had
to allege in order to state a "cause of action. '' 13' Lawyers thus continued to pay scrupulous regard for the form that pleadings took,
"mak[ing] the rules an end in themselves and not the means to an
end," as Charles Clark lamented, 132 even after the evolution of substantive doctrinal categories rendered them structurally irrelevant.
This attitude retarded the implementation of trans-substantivity.
The Field Code, for example, authorized the joinder of all causes of
action in a single suit that arose from the same "transaction.1' 33 Determined to preserve the spirit of common law pleading, 134 New York
courts construed the term "transaction" to allow joinder only of those
causes of action that could have been joined at common law. 135 The
earlier system made joinder dependent on the forms of action,1 36 so
this interpretation of the Field Code read the forms back into its terms
of the code. Joinder rules were thus substance-specific. The doctrinal
label that the substantive law assigned to the plaintiff's claim controlled the procedural avenues that were open to her.
A reluctance to acknowledge the substance-procedure dichotomy
accompanied the persistence of this common law mentality. The
forms of action filled some casebooks on pleading and practice of the
early twentieth century, manifesting the belief, as one of the casebook
editors put it, that "a common law foundation" must precede any
study of "modern pleading devices.' 37 Proponents of this procedural
pedagogy invoked the benefits that the study of the forms of action
130. See Henry Upson Sims, The Problem of Reforming Procedure, 21 YALE L.J. 215, 232
(1912).
131. JOHN D. WORKS, JURIDICAL REFORM 17-18 (1919).

132. Charles E. Clark, The Code Cause of Action, 33 YALE L.J. 817, 819 (1924).
133. Mitchell G. Williams, Pleading Reform in Nineteenth Century America: The Joinder of
Actions at Common Law and Under the Codes, 6 J. LEGAL HIST. 299, 320 (1985).
134. See McArthur v. Moffett, 128 N.W. 445, 446 (Wis. 1910) (describing the motive of New
York courts).
135. See, e.g., Anderson v. Hill, 53 Barb. 238 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1869).
136. See JOSEPH H. KOFFLER & ALISON REPPY, HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW PLEADING
§ 26, at 98-100 (1969); Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 312
(1938).
137. ROSWELL MAGILL, CASES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE vii (1927); see also Roswell F. Magill,

An Introductory Course in Civil Procedure,6 AM. L. SCH. REV.119, 120 (1927) (explaining why
"the study of modern civil procedure must be grounded upon the study of common-law procedure"). See generally Mary Brigid McManamon, The History of the Civil Procedure Course: A
Study in Evolving Pedagogy, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 397, 422-33 (1998).
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would offer a student's education in substantive law. 13 8 The common
law mentality's survival also meant that, for some commentators, procedural rules served purposes other than the efficient implementation
of the substantive law. In his famous 1906 address on defects in
American law, Roscoe Pound complained that common law pleading
fostered the attitude that the purpose of procedure was to make litigation an adversarial sport and not a mechanism for resolution of cases
139
on the merits.
Procedural reformers spent great energy during the first three decades of the twentieth century trying to rid procedural rules once and
for all of the last remnants of common law pleading. 140 The Federal
Rules represent the culmination of these efforts. Their doctrinal history is well known, 14 1 but the success that the 1938 authors had in
eliminating common law pleading and entrenching trans-substantivity
deserves further comment. The Federal Rules left substance-specific
procedure behind by closing the entry points through which the forms
of action had crept back into the code reforms. The authors eschewed
the term "cause of action" in Rule 8 in part to discourage courts from
turning to the common law forms in order to determine what a plaintiff must allege to adequately state a claim.142 Rule 18, which governs
joinder of claims, avoids both "cause of action" and "transaction," enabling joinder without any restriction based on the doctrinal categories from which the claims come. 143 At a more basic level, the 1938
authors, following Bentham's lead, committed themselves to simple
1 44
rules that were designed to vest ample discretion in trial judges.
138. See Roy W. McDonald, The Procedure Curriculumin a Periodof Reform, 9 AM. L. SCH.
REV. 1053, 1055 (1941). But see Charles E. Clark, Book Review, 47 HARV. L. REV. 148, 148
(1933) (reviewing JAMES P. McBAINE, CASES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE (1933)) (complaining that

this attitude leads to instruction in the common law forms of action, which "is the worst possible
approach to modern pleading conceptions").
139. See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of PopularDissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, in REPORT OF THE TWENTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 395, 405 (1906).
140. Clark, for example, repeatedly expressed frustration at the persistence of a common law
mentality into the twentieth century. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, The Cause of Action, 82 U. PA.
L. REV. 354, 355 (1934); Charles E. Clark, Editorial Comment, Ancient Writs and Modern
Causes of Action, 34 YALE L.J. 879, 884 (1925).
141. The classic history is Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedurein Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
142. Cf Edson R. Sunderland, The New FederalRules, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 5, 12 (1938) (claiming
that Rule 8 avoids the term "cause of action" because it lacks intrinsic meaning and "has given
trouble").
143. FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a).

144. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, Pre-Trial Orders and Pre-Trial As a Part of Trial, 23 F.R.D.
506, 506 (1959).
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395

The generality that this design required led logically to trans-substan145
tive rules.
2.

Trans-Substantivity and Institutional Legitimacy

A committee of experts, working under the supervision of the Supreme Court, drafted the Federal Rules. Charles Clark, the commit146
tee's reporter and the most significant influence on its final product,
identified expert rulemaking under court supervision, as opposed to
procedural reform through statutory enactment, as the most important procedural milestone that the Federal Rules marked. 147 He believed that legislative control over procedure had led to "indifference
and political manipulation," and that it had hobbled the ability of procedural reform to keep pace with constantly evolving litigation
needs. 148 For Clark and others, court-supervised rulemaking, meaning
committees of experts working under the aegis of a high court, 149 was
150
the preferred mode for reform going forward.
Indeed, the lawyers interested in procedural reform advocated for
the return of procedural rulemaking power to the judiciary, a power
these lawyers believed was inherently judicial. 5 1 The pendulum had
swung back from Field's insistence on procedure as a set of legislative
commands and his distrust of judicial control over procedural reins.
145. Cf.Tidmarsh, supra note 26, at 1747 (arguing that trans-substantivity is consistent with
general, open-textured rules).
146. See Bone, supra note 114, at 80; Subrin, supra note 141, at 961.
147. Charles E. Clark, A Striking Feature of the Proposed New Rules, 22 A.B.A. J. 787, 789
(1936).
148. See Charles E. Clark, The Challengeof a New Federal Civil Procedure,20 CORNELL L.Q.
443, 457 (1935).
149. See Clark, supra note 3, at 446.
150. See, e.g., Edgar B. Tolman, Address Before the Seventh Annual Judicial Conference of
the Fourth Circuit (June 11, 1937), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE: COMMITTEES ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 1935-1988, at 5-6, microformed on CIS No. Cl-

929 (Cong. Info. Serv.); Joseph A. Wickes, The New Rule-Making Power of the United States
Supreme Court, 13 TEX. L. REV. 1, 15 (1934).
151. See E.F. Albertsworth, Leading Developments in Procedural Reform, 7 CORNELL L.Q.
310, 324-25 (1922); Roscoe Pound, Regulation of Judicial Procedureby Rules of Court, 10 ILL.
L. REV. 163, 169-71 (1915); John H. Wigmore, Editorial Comment, All Legislative Rules for
Judiciary ProcedureAre Void Constitutionally,23 ILL. L. REV. 276, 276 (1928); Note, Power of
Court to Promulgate Rules for Inferior Courts, 69 U.S. L. REV. 1 (1935). One might think that
the decades of effort to secure the Rules Enabling Act-which delegated to courts the power to
craft procedural rules-would have undercut the confidence with which these lawyers argued
that courts enjoyed this inherent authority. But no; as one lawyer suggested, the Rules Enabling
Act merely "render[ed] unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's." Arthur S. Dayton, The Act of
June 19, 1934, from a Historical Viewpoint: Remarks at the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Federal
Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit (June 1935), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE:

COMMITTEES

ON

RULES

OF

PRACTICE

microformed on CIS No. CI-931 (Cong. Info. Serv.).

AND

PROCEDURE,

1935-1988, at 57,
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Legislatures, reformers typically believed, had a tendency to burden a
simple code with detailed amendments that turned it into a "voluminous, intricate and inelastic system of civil practice," as George Wickersham put it.1 52 Moreover, the desire to bind judicial hands
jeopardized the success of a trans-substantive code. "No two contested suits are precisely alike," Edgar Tolman noted, and generally
applicable procedural rules must vest judges with the flexibility to apply them in a manner sensitive to case-specific context. 153 But statutory rules would compel judges to bend to legislative "command" and
prevent this sort of case-specific application, rendering generally applicable rules inoperable. 154
The jurisprudential prerequisite of trans-substantivity and the normative assumption that accompanied its rise helped to legitimate the
allocation of rulemaking power to the judiciary. They reinforced the
notion of procedural reform as value-neutral, and hence, the reforms
were appropriately pursued outside the political process. The substance-procedure dichotomy had become an article of faith for many
lawyers by 1938.155 The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, by which Congress delegated rulemaking power to the Supreme Court, codified the
dichotomy with the requirement that any rules enacted pursuant to its
terms not "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. '156
Prominent reformers similarly agreed on the purpose of procedural
rules, sharing the normative assumption Bentham and Field made.
Clark, for example, insisted that procedural rules exist "to aid in the
efficient application of the substantive law,"1 5 7 and that any other pur-

pose would inappropriately treat the rules as ends and not means. Edmond Morgan defined "the sole object of any procedural system'-as
"the attainment of a just and speedy decision upon the merits, accord-

152. Wickersham, supra note 2, at 904; see also Address of Chief Justice Hughes, 21 A.B.A. J.
340, 341 (1935) (lamenting that "the simple form of unified procedure originally adopted came
to be overlaid with procedural monstrosities due to legislative tinkering and elaboration").
153. Tolman, supra note 150, at 6.
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Wash. S. Nay. Co. v. Balt. & Phila. Steamboat Co., 263 U.S. 629, 635 (1924);
Edson R. Sunderland, An Inquiry Concerning the Functions of Procedurein Legal Education, 21
MICH. L. REV. 372, 382 (1923); see also Subrin, supra note 44, at 1650-51 (observing that the
authors of the 1938 Federal Rules, along with other procedural reformers, accepted a dichotomy
between substance and procedure).
156. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
157. Charles E. Clark, History, Systems and Functions of Pleading, 11 VA. L. REV. 517, 519
(1925); see also CLARK, supra note 1, at 28 (noting that the purpose of procedural rules is to
assist in the "working out of justice through the rules of substantive law").
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ing to the principles of substantive law, at the lowest practicable
159
cost."'1 58 Others made similar claims.
Statements like these reflected the perception of value-neutrality in
procedure. The discourse lawyers of the day used to diagnose procedural ills in advance of the Federal Rules exemplifies this perceived
value-neutrality. Existing code and common law systems suffered
from "delay," "expense," and "uncertainty," problems that, regardless
of substantive policy preference, all could agree needed eradication. 160
Edson Sunderland likened successful procedural reform to "a new
method of treating cancer"; without question, "every intelligent doctor in the world would almost immediately know about it and attempt
to take advantage of it."'161 Clark, a more sophisticated theorist than
most reformers, did identify "values" in procedural rules, but he described them in neutral terms of accuracy and efficiency.' 62 Reformers couched some of their arguments for court-supervised rulemaking
in similarly neutral ways, comparing the speed and expertise of courts
to the gridlock and inexperience of legislatures.' 63 In an age still beholden to tenets from nineteenth-century legal science, the value-neutrality of procedure meant that its rules could be "reform[ed]," while
64
substantive law could only be "restate[d].'1
158. Edmund M. Morgan, Judicial Regulation of Court Procedure, 2 MINN. L. REV. 81, 83
(1918).
159. See, e.g., Edwin M. Borchard, Judicial Relief for Peril and Insecurity, 45 HARV. L. REV.
793, 800-01 (1932) ("Procedure became recognized in all modern systems as a method provided
by the state for the assurance, guaranty, and vindication of substantive rights .... "); Laurance
M. Hyde, From Common Law Rules to Rules of Court, 22 WASH. U. L.Q. 187, 204 (1937); Roscoe Pound, Some Principlesof ProceduralReforn, 4 ILL. L. REV. 388, 394 (1910) ("[T]he end of
legal procedure is to bring about results in accord with the substantive law .... "); Adolph J.
Rodenbeck, Principles of a Modern Procedure,2 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 100, 103-04 (1918)
(arguing that "the substantive rights of the parties should be the primary consideration" for
procedural rules); Austin W. Scott, The Progressof the Law, 1918-1919, 33 HARV. L. REV. 236,
236 (1919).
160. E.g., Edgar Bronson Tolman, Historical Beginnings of ProceduralReform Movement in
This Country-Principlesto Be Observed in Making Rules, 22 A.B.A. J. 783, 786 (1936); see also
Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 324 (2d Cir. 1957) (recollecting that the intended purpose
of the 1938 Federal Rules was to end delay and mistakes in adjudication); Robert G. Bone,
Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 319, 324 (2008)
(describing early twentieth-century reformers' belief that procedural reform "was mainly a technical exercise in perfecting administrative machinery," and that "[tihe values relevant to this task
were not substantive in nature" but rather "practical values of sound administrative design").
161. Edson R. Sunderland, Joinder of Actions, 18 MICH. L. REV. 571, 572 (1920).
162. See Charles E. Clark, ProceduralAspects of the New State Independence, 8 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1230, 1234 (1940).
163. See, e.g., Manley 0. Hudson, Why Confer Rule-Making Power on Courts?, 7 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'y 161, 161-62 (1924).

164. Thurman Arnold, The Rdle of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal Process, 45
HARV. L. REV. 617, 643 (1932).
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This supposed value-neutrality enabled the distinction between

rulemaking and legislation. 165 Pound argued, for example, that "it
ought to be easy to make changes of detail in procedure" because
"rights are well defined by substantive law."'1 66 If procedural rules
had no purpose of their own but existed merely to serve the substan-

tive law, then their creation and alteration were value-neutral. They
could thus properly come within the province of unelected experts operating outside the political branches. 167 In a section stressing the distinction between substance and procedure, a 1926 Senate Report on
an early version of what would become the Rules Enabling Act pro-

vided that lawyers and judges "unanimously agreed," "with an absence of all partisan spirit," on the wisdom of court-supervised
rulemaking. 168 In short, trans-substantivity strengthened the institutional legitimacy of the court-supervised rulemaking process that produced the Federal Rules. 169 So long as court-supervised rulemakers
stayed within the bounds of trans-substantivity, they could appropriately generate procedural rules. 170
Reformers stressed this value-neutrality in order to win political
support for the ultimately successful effort to vest court-supervised
rulemakers with the power to craft rules for federal litigation.' 7 '
Clark referred to procedural rulemaking in value-neutral terms in order to deny that a court-supervised process suffered from a democratic deficit. 172 Sunderland insisted that procedural reform does not
attract the attention of legislators because "the only impulse toward
procedural reform arises from the general desire of the public to get a
better administration of justice," and such value-neutral motivations

165. See Robert G. Bone, Securing the Normative Foundations of Litigation Reform, 86 B.U.
L. Rev. 1155, 1170 (2006) (observing that the 1938 authors "viewed the design of procedural
rules as primarily an engineering task devoid of substantive policy choice, and viewed judges as
engineering experts in matters of procedural design"); Charles Anthony Riedl, To What Extent
May Courts Under the Rule-Making Power Prescribe Rules of Evidence?, 26 A.B.A. J. 601, 604
(1940).
166. Pound, supra note 151, at 167.
167. See Bone, supra note 16, at 894-97.
168. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AUTHORIZING SUPREME COURT TO MAKE
AND PUBLISH RULES IN COMMON-LAw ACTIONS, S. REP. No. 69-1174, at 13 (1926).
169. See Subrin, supra note 141, at 960.
170. For a more recent assertion of this link between trans-substantivity and the apolitical
nature of procedural rules, see Carrington, supra note 25, at 2085.
171. See Subrin, supra note 16, at 2006.
172. See Charles E. Clark, Two Decades of the FederalCivil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435,
444 n.45 (1958) ("Rule-making is a matter for research, study, and judicious analysis and critiques, not one for the public platform.").
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rarely motivate legislators to act. 173 Objectors to early versions of the
Rules Enabling Act feared that a rulemaking body operating outside
congressional control would stray into matters of substantive policy or
encroach on legislative prerogative in other ways. 174 A contributor to
what became the Rules Enabling Act included its "substantive rights"

restriction in part to assuage those who were apprehensive of usurpative courts that rulemakers would not exceed their institutional au-

at
thority. 175 The 1926 Senate Report dwelled on this restriction
176
length to rebut criticism of court-supervised rulemaking.
3. Doubts at the Moment of Triumph

The story of trans-substantivity's rise ends here, with the successful
promulgation of the 1938 Federal Rules through a value-neutral,

court-supervised rulemaking process. But the story has an important
coda. Somewhat paradoxically, just as the Federal Rules anchored the
trans-substantivity principle as a foundational plank for American
civil procedure, its jurisprudential prerequisite began to weaken.
Doubts concerning the robustness of the substance-procedure dichot-

omy had begun to fester by the 1930s.17 7 Consistent with their distrust
of abstract legal conceptions, the legal realists insisted that the boundary between substance and procedure did not exist in any hard-and1 78
fast way. For Clark, "the line between them is shadowy at best,"'
173. Edson R. Sunderland, The Regulation of Procedure by Rules Originatingin the Judicial
Council, 10 IND. L.J. 202, 204 (1935).
174. Cf.Charles E. Clark & Charles Alan Wright, The Judicial Council and the Rule-Making
Power-A Dissent and a Protest, 1 SYRACUSE L. REV. 346, 364 (1950) (claiming that "good
reasons" exist to limit rulemaking authority "strictly ...to matters of procedure and practice");
Silas A. Harris, The Rule-Making Power, in A.B.A. SPECIAL COMM. ON IMPROVING THE ADMIN.
OF JUSTICE, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION MONOGRAPHS 1, 14-15 (1942) (expressing concern over

the proper allocation of rulemaking power between court and legislature); William M. Trumbull,
Judicial Responsibilityfor Regulating Practice and Procedure in Illinois, 47 Nw. U. L. REV. 443,
451 (1952) (arguing against broad rulemaking power on grounds that it would infringe on legislative prerogative); Thomas J. Walsh, Reform of FederalProcedure,6 TENN. L. REV. 32, 52 (1927)
(arguing against the delegation of rulemaking power to courts on grounds that it belongs in the
legislature); Sam Bass Warner, The Role of Courts and Judicial Councils in ProceduralReform,
85 U. PA. L. REV. 441, 447 (1937) (observing that "[slome of the problems of procedural reform
touch too closely the liberties of citizens to be decided in a democracy by any body not subject to
the popular will").
175. Burbank, supra note 16, at 1073; cf Austin W. Scott, Actions at Law in the Federal
Courts, 38 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1924) (arguing for court-supervised rulemaking but noting that it
must be circumscribed by a "substantive rights" limit).
176. See S. REP. No. 69-1174, at 9-16 (1926).
177. For a thorough treatment of the issue from this time, see Edgar H. Ailes, Substance and
Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 39 MICH. L. REV. 392 (1941).
178. Clark, supra note 157, at 519.
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while Walter Wheeler Cook claimed that a "twilight zone" separated
79
the two.'
Mirroring this theoretical disquiet, the 1938 authors struggled to get
a handle on the Rules Enabling Act's "substantive rights" restriction. 8 0° Sunderland acknowledged that the "categories" of both
"pleading, practice, and procedure" and also "substantive rights"
"have acquired no settled meeting."' 8 1 As the committee began its
work, Edgar Tolman wrote to then Yale professor Ernest Lorenzen to
ask for "a formula or test" to draw "a satisfactory distinction between
procedure and substantive law.' 82 Lorenzen responded that "no definite line can be drawn" and that any such distinction would "be necessarily an arbitrary one. ' 183 Perhaps influenced by Lorenzen's letter,
in 1937, Tolman would confess that "[t]he distinction between law as a
rule of human conduct and the law of practice and procedure is not
' 184
always easy to draw.
Clark did not despair, however, that the substance-procedure dichotomy was so theoretically bereft as to jeopardize court-supervised
rulemaking. He agreed with Walter Cook's claim that the labels "substance" and "procedure" had a "common core of meaning" that made
them pragmatically useful. 18 5 So long as the purpose for the classification was explained, a lawyer could meaningfully classify something as
either substantive or procedural. 186 Sunderland concurred. 187 The
1938 authors appear to have simply put nagging doubts to one side,
179. Walter Wheeler Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE
L.J. 333, 334 (1933). For other realists, see Ailes, supra note 177, at 393-94 (quoting Ernest
Lorenzen); Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV.
431, 448 (1930). An even more radical denial of any difference came earlier, from the English
evidence scholar Charles Frederic Chamberlayne. See 1 CHARLES FREDERIC CHAMBERLAYNE,
A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE § 171, at 217 (1911) ("The distinction between

substantive and procedural law is artificial and illusory. In essence, there is none.").
180. See generally Burbank, supra note 16, at 1134 n.530, 1132-37.
181. Edson R. Sunderland, Characterand Extent of the Rule-Making Power Granted U.S. Supreme Court and Methods of Effective Exercise, 21 A.B.A. J. 404, 405 (1935).
182. Letter from Edgar B. Tolman to Ernest G. Lorenzen (July 11, 1935), in RECORDS OF THE
U.S.

JUDICIAL

CONFERENCE:

COMMITrEES

ON

RULES

OF PRACTICE

AND

PROCEDURE,

1935-1988, microformed on CIS No. CI-931 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
183. Letter from Ernest G. Lorenzen to Edgar B. Tolman (Aug. 5, 1935), in RECORDS OF THE
U.S.

JUDICIAL

CONFERENCE:

COMMITrEES ON

RULES

OF PRACTICE

AND

PROCEDURE,

1935-1988, microformed on CIS No. CI-931 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
184. Edgar Bronson Tolman, Address Before the Law Club (Nov. 6, 1936), in RECORDS OF
THE U.S.

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE: COMMITTEES ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,

1935-1988, at 6, microformed on CIS No. CI-929 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
185. Cook, supra note 179, at 339; see also Clark, supra note 162, at 1234.
186. The burden of proof for contributory negligence might be classified as substantive in
some instances and procedural in others, but the distinction is still useful once the purpose for
the classification is illuminated. See Cook, supra note 179, at 345.
187. See Sunderland, supra note 181, at 406.
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perhaps so as not to let the Rules Enabling Act stand in the way of
their achievement. By 1938, William Mitchell, the chair of the Advisory Committee, would report publicly, and inaccurately, that he and
his colleagues "found very little difficulty" respecting the Rules Enabling Act's "substantive rights" restriction. 188
One theorist of the 1930s pressed the attack on the dichotomy's theoretical integrity more completely, and for reasons discussed in Part
IV, his view has arguably proven more prescient. To Thurman Arnold, a realist sympathizer, 189 the dichotomy expressed an "attitude"
about the sanctity of law. Substantive law was "sacred" and unchangeable, while procedural law was "practical" and could be reworked to achieve desired results. 9 0° But while different in name, the
two were functionally indistinct as tools for dealing with a particular
legal problem. As Arnold wryly explained, "[s]ubstantive law is canonized procedure," while "[p]rocedure is unfrocked substantive
law."' 19 1 If thwarted by a supposedly unchangeable substantive law
doctrine, a judge aiming for a particular result could restate the problem as a procedural one and thereby expand his discretion, and thus
192
power, to reach the desired answer.
IV.

TRANS-SUBSTANTIVITY

IN THE PRESENT

From the debut of the Federal Rules until the 1970s or so, an odd
jurisprudential equilibrium remained in place. Clark's and Cook's
take on the shadowy divide between substance and procedure prevailed as accepted wisdom.1 93 But the substance-procedure dichot188. Proceedings of the Institute on Federal Rules, Cleveland, Ohio, July 21-23, 1938, at 183.
But cf.Burbank, supra note 16, at 1134 n.530 (describing Mitchell's vacillation on this point).
189. For a discussion of Arnold's sympathy with but critique of realism, see Mark Fenster, The
Symbols of Governance: Thurman Arnold and Post-RealistLegal Theory, 51 BuFF.L. REV. 1053
(2003).
190. Arnold, supra note 164, at 643; accord Thurman W. Arnold, Institute Priests and Yale
Observers-A Reply to Dean Goodrich, 84 U. PA. L. REV. 811, 819 (1936).
191. Arnold, supra note 164, at 645.
192. See id.; see also Charles M. Yablon, Justifying the Judge's Hunch: An Essay on Discretion,
41 HASTINGS L.J. 231, 244-46 (1990) (describing Arnold's argument).
193. Cf Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
Matters of "substance" and matters of "procedure" are much talked about in the books
as though they defined a great divide cutting across the whole domain of law. But, of
course, "substance" and "procedure" are the same key-words to very different
problems. Neither "substance" nor "procedure" represents the same invariants. Each
implies different variables depending upon the particular problem for which it is used.
Id. For a non-academic perspective from the time, see Thomas H. S.Curd, Substance and Procedure in Rule Making, 51 W. VA. L.Q. 34 (1948).
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omy continued to live in the minds of lawyers.'
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Procedure retained

a value-neutral veneer, consistent with the assumption that it merely
served policy choices reflected in substantive law. The Judicial Code

of 1948, for example, which included important changes to federal jurisdictional and venue law, passed both houses of Congress unanimously. Although formally a statute, it came into being through
nearly the same apolitical, court-supervised process that generated the
195

Federal Rules.
For a number of reasons, the landscape began to shift in the
1970s. 196 Class action commentary from the time, addressing in particular the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, offers a flavor of the skepticism about the supposed boundary between substance and procedure
and the latter's value-neutrality.' 97 Attorneys objected to the tendency of courts to shape substantive doctrine, to fit better the new
requirements for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3), 198 as an impermissible circumvention of the Rules Enabling Act's "substantive
rights" limitation. 199 The power of class actions to extend remedies
otherwise unavailable to small-value claimants also attracted criticism. 2 00 The aggregation made possible by the 1966 amendments
194. Cf. Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure,Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1677, 1693-95 (2004) (describing the apolitical nature of procedural reform from
1938-1973).
195. See William W. Barron, The Judicial Code 1948 Revision, 8 F.R.D. 439, 439-40 (1949); cf.
Albert B. Maris, New Federal Judicial Code: Enactment by 80th Congress a Notable Gain, 34
A.B.A. J. 863, 863-64 (1948) (describing the Judicial Code as "noncontroversial"). For a discussion of the extent to which the Judicial Code amounted to reorganization and restyling generally,
see Maris, supra, at 863. It is instructive to compare this restyling to the 2007 restyling of the
Federal Rules, which triggered a fair amount of controversy. See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett,
Against (Mere) Restyling, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 155 (2006).
196. See Bone, supra note 16, at 900; see also Burbank, supra note 194, at 1710 (describing
why procedure became politicized in the 1970s); Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking "Substantive Rights"
(in the Rules EnablingAct) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 55 (1998) (describing
Congress's role in rulemaking after the early 1970s); Laurens Walker, The End of the New Deal
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1269, 1281-82 (1997) (describing a
proliferation of rulemaking in the 1970s); Charles Alan Wright, Foreword: The Malaise of Federal Rulemaking, 14 REV. LITIG. 1, 11 (1994) (lamenting the politicization of procedure starting
in the 1970s).
197. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer
Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 842 (1974); William
Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375 (1973). Another
example is a growing awareness of how the Federal Rules' muscular discovery provisions facilitated developments in fields such as products liability and employment discrimination. See, e.g.,
Jack H. Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,69 CAL. L. REV. 806, 818-19 (1981).
198. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907-08 (9th Cir. 1975); Hal S. Scott, The Impact of Class Actions on Rule lOb-5, 38 U. CHi. L. REV. 337 (1971).
199. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 197, at 383-86.
200. See Landers, supra note 197, at 860..
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fanned fears that defendants would settle claims with little substantive
merit, in effect if not in form, thereby transforming the substantive
strength of a plaintiff's alleged rights. 201 These and other concerns
motivated Congress in 1979 to try, albeit unsuccessfully, to enact a
legislative amendment to Rule 23 that would have required courts to
assess the substantive strength of plaintiffs' claims before granting
20 2
class certification.
Since the 1970s, in several heavily litigated fields, the breakdown in
the substance-procedure dichotomy has manifested itself in the emergence of substance-specific rules. After decades of acquiescence to
the federal rulemaking process as the primary engine for procedural
change, 20 3 Congress dramatically jumped into the fray with substancespecific procedural measures that were designed to explicitly achieve
ends of substantive policy. For some, these developments threaten the
continued viability of the trans-substantivity principle as a founda20 4
tional plank for American civil procedure.
But the story of trans-substantivity at the dawn of the twenty-first
century is not so straightforward. Rather than follow the legislative
lead and promulgate or approve substance-specific rules or substancespecific rule constructions, court-supervised rulemakers within the
federal system continue to respect and in some instances vigorously
reassert the trans-substantivity limit on their power. Far from a departure from past practice, the pattern of legislative and judicial rulemak201. See Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to ProceduralInnovations in Antitrust
Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971); see also William H. Simon, Commentary, The Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and Professional
Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29, 46 (explaining the implications of Handler's argument). Handler is
cited as the originator of the "legalized blackmail" idea. See, e.g., Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and "Blackmail" Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1377, 1378 n.3 (2000). However, lawyers used this idea to complain about abuses
in complex litigation before Handler coined the phrase. See, e.g., Clyde A. Armstrong, The Use
of Pretrialand Discovery Rules: Expedition and Economy in Federal Civil Cases, 43 A.B.A. J.
693, 695 (1957).
202. See Stephen Berry, Ending Substance's Indenture to Procedure:The Imperative for Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage Action, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 299, 334-39 (1980).
203. One important exception to this acquiescence was the collective action provision in the
Fair Labor Standards Act as enacted in 1938. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No.
75-718, ch. 676, § 16(b), 52 Stat. 1060, 1069 (1938) (codified as amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219).
It authorized a designated representative to sue on behalf of all employees for violations of the
statute. See 29 U.S.C. § 217(b). After a series of Supreme Court decisions greatly increased
employers' potential liability for so-called portal-to-portal claims, Congress responded in 1947
by prohibiting what amounted to opt-out class actions under the collective action provision. See
generally Marc Linder, Class Struggle at the Door: The Originsof the Portal-to-PortalAct of 1947,
39 BunF. L. REV. 53, 167-75 (1991).
204. See, e.g., Fairman, supra note 13, at 622; Carl Tobias, Reforming Common Sense Legal
Reforms, 30 CONN. L. REV. 537, 551-52 (1998).
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ing since the mid-1990s reflects the same institutional allocation of
rulemaking power that had evolved by the 1930s.
A.

The Uncertain Legislative Fate of Trans-Substantivity

In securities, prisoner, and medical malpractice litigation, Congress
and state legislatures have enacted substance-specific procedural reforms to accomplish particular goals of substantive policy. These stat-

utes show the prescience in Thurman Arnold's doubts about the
substance-procedure dichotomy. Both categories can yield legal tools
that are designed to achieve the same policy outcome, and they thus
are functionally indistinguishable. These legislative forays highlight
the theoretical incoherence of the substance-procedure dichotomy.

In the mid-1990s, Congress enacted several major pieces of legislation addressing pleading standards. 2 0 5 It passed the Prison Litigation

Reform Act (PLRA) 20 6 in response to two perceived problems: an
avalanche of prisoner lawsuits ostensibly swamping the federal courts
and prison micromanagement by federal judges. 20 7 The former was
arguably a procedural one because it involved judicial caseloads and
thus the efficiency of the federal courts. But the selection of prison
lawsuits as the vehicle to address these problems necessarily required

a determination as to the substantive value of this litigation as a policy
matter. Moreover, a procedural purpose may have only partially motivated Congress to act. Whether dockets were swamped and whether

this swamp needed draining were debatable questions in light of the
fact that the rate of prisoner filings had actually fallen fairly significantly in the fifteen years before the PLRA's enactment. 20 8 The lob205. In addition to the statutes discussed here, Congress has kicked around several other substance-specific pleading requirements. Had President Clinton not vetoed it, the Common Sense
Product Liability and Legal Reform Act of 1996 would have imposed a particular sanctions
regime in place of what Rule 11 provides for product liability claims. See H.R. 956, 104th Cong.
(1996); see also Jeffrey A. Parness & Amy Leonetti, Expert Opinion Pleading: Any Merit to
Special Certificatesof Merit?, 1997 B.Y.U. L. REv. 537, 545-49. Procedural concerns-for example that Rule 11 had inadequately assisted in the resolution of product liability cases on their
substantive merits-did not motivate the bill. Rather, the hope was that the pleading reform
would help lessen the deleterious economic impact of product liability litigation. See, e.g., H.R.
REP. No. 104-63, pt. 1, at 8-12 (1995). Congress also enacted a heightened pleading provision
for claims arising out of the so-called Y2K problem. See Fairman, supra note 13, at 612-17.
206. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321.
207. See The Prison Litigation Reform Act and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act: Implicationsfor FederalDistrictJudges, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1846, 1853 (2002); see also Mark
Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 47-48
(1997) (describing the purposes of the PLRA).
208. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Exhaustion Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act: The Consequence of ProceduralError, 52 EMORY L.J. 1771, 1776-77 (2003).
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bying arm of the federal judiciary-the supposed beneficiary of the
procedural reform-offered mild opposition to the statute. 20 9 In all
likelihood, entreaties from state attorneys general for relief from the
expense and burden of prisoner litigation defense-a policy goal different from the efficient resolution of cases on their merits-played a
larger role in motivating Congress to restrict prisoner access to
courts.

21 o

The PLRA did not prescribe heightened pleading requirements, but
it included changes to other aspects of pleading practice that departed
significantly from trans-substantive requirements in the Federal Rules.
Prisoners, for example, must exhaust available administrative remedies before filing suit;2 11 indigent inmates must pay filing fees; 2 1 2 and
district courts must screen complaints before they are served on defendants and dismiss a complaint sua sponte if it is "frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or...
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. '2 13 Unlike Rule 12, which requires an answer or pre-answer motion from the defendant as a matter of course, 2 14 the PLRA excuses a
named defendant from answering under some circumstances, and the
court can order a responsive pleading only if "the plaintiff has a rea'21 5
sonable opportunity to prevail on the merits.
209. See REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 64-65 (1995); Judith Resnik, The FederalCourts and Congress:Additional Sources, Alternative Texts, and Altered Aspirations, 86 GEO. L.J. 2589, 2633-34 (1998).
210. See, e.g., Roosevelt, supra note 208, at 1777; see also Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation,
116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1557-58 (2003). See generally Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574,
596 (1998) (suggesting that the PLRA was passed at least in part to discourage prisoner litiga-

tion); Jeffrey R. Maahs & Rolando V. del Carmen, Curtailing Frivolous Section 1983 Inmate
Litigation:Laws, Practices,and Proposals,59 FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1995, at 53, 57-58 (describing appeals from attorneys general); Laurie Smith Camp, Why Nebraska Needs Prison Litigation
Reform, 76 NEB. L. REV. 781, 784-85 (1997) (same). For examples of the influence of state

attorneys general in the PLRA's legislative history, see, for example, 142 CoNG. REC. 8236-38
(Apr. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen. Abraham) (relaying concerns of state attorneys general as to
the expense of prisoner litigation); 141 CONG. REC. 26,552-53 (Sept. 27, 1995) (reprinting a
letter from the National Association of Attorneys General).
211. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006).
212. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)-(2) (2006).
213. Id. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2).
214. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1).
215. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2). Soon after the PLRA's enactment, some thought that this provision amounted to a new, heightened pleading requirement for plaintiffs. See, e.g., Eugene J.
Kuzinski, Note, The End of the Prison Law Firm?: Frivolous Inmate Litigation, Judicial Oversight, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 361, 381 & n.116 (1998).
Courts, however, have interpreted this language to mean that if the prisoner's complaint would
survive a motion to dismiss under standard pleading rules, then the courts can order the defendant to answer the complaint. See, e.g., Proctor v. Vadlamudi, 992 F. Supp. 156, 158 (N.D.N.Y.
1998).
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Congress lumped these nominally procedural reforms together with
nominally substantive ones. Some-a restriction on judicial power to
issue prospective injunctive relief2 16 and a time limit placed on prospective injunctions, for example 217-target the purported problem of
judicial activism in the area of prison condition oversight. Othersincluding a prohibition on claims for mental or emotional injuries
without proof of accompanying physical injury,218 limits on attorneys'
fees, 2 19 and the requirement that any damages award go to an out-

standing restitution order 220-complement the pleading reforms that
target allegedly excessive inmate litigation. In short, a set of mostly
substantive policy goals moved Congress to act, and it responded with
a mix of substantive and procedural reforms that, as far as achieving
these goals are concerned, are functionally indistinguishable. Emerging from this legislative milieu, the PLRA's pleading requirements,
although they affect the efficiency and accuracy of the conduct of
prison litigation, also have a substantive effect by design.
Congress singled out securities litigation for special procedural
treatment with the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA). 21 According to the Senate Report on the statute, Congress intended it "to lower the cost of raising capital by combating"
certain perceived "abuses" in securities class action litigation. 222 The
report elaborated three "purposes" that mix substantive policy goals
with procedural concerns: "to encourage the voluntary disclosure of
information by issuers," "to empower investors so that they, not their
lawyers, control securities litigation," and "to encourage plaintiffs'
lawyers to pursue valid claims for securities fraud and to encourage
defendants to fight abusive claims. '223
Like the PLRA, the PSLRA contains a mixture of nominally substantive and procedural reforms. Examples of the former include limits on joint and several liability for violation of securities laws, the
insulation of certain issuer statements from liability, and the elimina224
tion of securities fraud as a predicate offense for civil RICO claims.
Among the latter, two pleading requirements depart from the trans216. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2006).
217. Id. § 3626(b)(1)(A).
218. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2006).
219. Id. § 3006A.
220. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2006).
221. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737.
222. S.REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995).
223. Id.at 5-6.
224. See MICHAEL A. PERINO, SECURITIES
1025-29 (2008).

LITIGATION AFTER THE REFORM ACT

§ 101.B, at
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substantivity principle. Plaintiffs who allege upon information and be-

lief must state "with particularity all facts on which that belief is
formed"; and for scienter allegations, plaintiffs must "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the requisite state of mind. '2 2 5 Again, like the PLRA, the
PSLRA treats nominally substantive and procedural reforms as functionally indistinct tools used to achieve a single set of substantive pol-

icy goals.
Perhaps most significantly as a practical matter, given the volume of
cases implicated, dozens of state legislatures have departed from the
trans-substantivity principle and enacted special pleading requirements for medical malpractice cases.22 6 These range from detailed
fact pleading requirements, 22 7 pre-filing notice requirements, 22 8 and

most commonly, provisions that require a plaintiff to file an expert
physician's affidavit or certificate of merit that attests to the merit of

the plaintiff's claims, either with the complaint or soon thereafter. 229

225. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B), (b)(2) (2006). The statute also requires plaintiffs to "specify
each statement alleged to have been misleading [and] the reason or reasons why the statement is
misleading." Id. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B). This requirement basically parallels the heightened pleading
requirement in Rule 9 for fraud claims more generally. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
226. See generally Mary Margaret Penrose & Dace A. Caldwell, A Short and Plain Solution to
the Medical Malpractice Crisis: Why Charles E. Clark Remains Prophetically CorrectAbout Special Pleading and the Big Case, 39 GA. L. REV. 971 (2005) (discussing various special pleading
requirements in medical malpractice litigation). For a discussion of some states' expert affidavit
requirements, see Parness & Leonetti, supra note 205, at 556-62. For a discussion of some procedural reforms undertaken to address the supposed crises in medical malpractice litigation, see
Catherine T. Struve, Doctors, the Adversary System, and ProceduralReform in Medical Liability
Litigation, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 943, 998-1004 (2004). See also id. at 1012-15 (discussing such
reforms and the principle of trans-substantivity). For a discussion of substance-specific procedural rules enacted at the state level more generally, see Seymour Moskowitz, Discovery in State
Civil Procedure: The National Perspective, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 121, 124-25 (2007).
227. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-551 (2008) (requiring plaintiffs suing health care providers to provide "a detailed specification and factual description of each act and omission alleged by plaintiff
to render the health care provider liable").
228. See FLA. STAT. § 766.106 (2006) (imposing a 90-day pre-filing notice requirement); TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.051(a) (2005) (requiring 60-day pre-filing notice); W. VA.
CODE § 55-7B-6(b) (2008) (requiring 30-day pre-filing notice).
229. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-209 (2006) (expert affidavit must be filed within thirty
days of complaint); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-20-602 (2006) (certificate of review must be filed
within sixty days of complaint); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-190a (2009) (complaint must include an
opinion from a health care provider); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6853 (2008) (affidavit of merit
with complaint); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (2009) (expert affidavit with complaint); 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/2-622(a)(1) (2009) (expert report attached to complaint); MICH. COMP. LAWS

§ 600.2912d (2000) (expert affidavit filed with complaint); MINN. STAT. § 145.682 (2005) (expert
affidavit attached to complaint); Mo. REV. STAT. § 538.225 (2008) (expert affidavit filed within
ninety days of complaint); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.071 (2009) (expert affidavit with complaint);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-46 (2009) (expert affidavit within three months of complaint); OHIO
R. Civ. P. 10(D)(2) (expert affidavit with complaint); PA. R. Civ. P. 1042.3 (certificate of merit
within sixty days of complaint); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-36-100 (2008) (expert affidavit with com-
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Legislatures often passed these substance-specific procedural rules as

parts of comprehensive medical malpractice reform packages alongside numerous substantive doctrinal changes. 230 As with Congress,
these legislatures used nominally procedural and substantive tools
alike to achieve the same set of policy goals, such as access to physician care and lower liability insurance premiums. 231 The Erie analysis
that federal courts have used, mostly in order to find litigants in diversity cases bound by these pleading requirements, 232 would have given
§ 8.01-20.1 (2007) (certificate of merit with complaint); WASH. REV.
§ 7.70.150 (2007) (certificate of merit with complaint); cf ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 12-2602, 12-2603 (2008) (requiring plaintiff to provide preliminary expert report with required
disclosures under ARiz. R. Civ. P. 26.1); FLA. STAT. § 766.104 (2006) (requiring affidavit from
attorney attached to complaint that states that the attorney received an expert report before
filing); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-58 (2002) (requiring attorney to execute certificate and attach it
to a complaint stating that the attorney consulted with an expert before filing); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:53A-27 (West 2000) (requiring that the plaintiff provide the defendant within sixty days of
the answer an expert affidavit); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3012-a (McKinney 2001) (requiring attorney to
file an affidavit with the complaint stating that the attorney consulted with an expert); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1A-l, Rule 9j)(1)-(3) (2008) (requiring that a complaint specifically state that the plaintiff consulted with an expert); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-1708.1E, invalidated by Zeier v. Zimmer,
Inc., 152 P.3d 861, 874-75 (Okla. 2006) (requiring that an expert affidavit be attached to a complaint); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 13.01 (TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.351)
(requiring an expert report 120 days after complaint is filed).
230. Texas's expert affidavit requirement, which requires plaintiffs to file expert affidavits
within 120 days of filing a complaint, was significantly strengthened as part of a wide-ranging
medical malpractice reform statute that included caps on noneconomic damages and a heightened burden of proof for claims against emergency physicians. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE § 74.351. See generally George C. Hanks, Jr. & Rachel Polinger-Hyman, Redefining the
Battlefield, 67 TEX. B.J. 936 (2004) (describing Texas's expert affidavit requirement); Detailed
Analysis of the Medical Liability Reforms (Part 111), 36 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 169, 193-214 (2005)
(same). Nevada enacted an expert affidavit requirement as part of a medical malpractice reform
statute that included caps on noneconomic damages. See Borger v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court,
102 P.3d 600, 602 (Nev. 2004).
231. See, e.g., Brad A. Elward, The 1985 Illinois Medical Malpractice Reform Act: An Overview and Analysis, 14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 27, 27, 35-38 (1989); Martha Rabaut, Where's (Dr.) Waldo?
Finding the Medical Malpractice Expert Witness Who Has Earned His Stripes, 9 MICH. ST. U. J.
MED. & L. 289, 289-90 (2005).
232. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 160-61 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying New
Jersey's expert affidavit requirement); Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp., 90 F.3d
1523, 1539-21 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying Colorado's certificate requirement); Lozoya v. Anderson, No. 07cv2148-IEG-WMc, 2008 WL 2476187, at *3-5 (S.D. Cal. July 17, 2008) (applying
Nevada's expert affidavit requirement); In re Zyprexa Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 08-CV-3249 (JBW),
2008 WL 4850122, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2008) (applying Mississippi's certificate requirement);
Bobo v. Umoh, No. 06-CV-4110, 2007 WL 725803, at *3 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 7, 2007) (applying
Arkansas's affidavit requirement); Chapman v. Chandra, No. 06-cv-0651-MJR, 2007 WL
1655799, at *2-5 (S.D. Ill. June 5, 2007) (applying Illinois's expert affidavit requirement); Lee v.
Putz, No. 1:03-CV-267, 2006 WL 1791304, at *4 (W.D. Mich. June 27,2006) (applying Michigan's
expert affidavit requirement); Moreland v. Barrette, No. CV 05-480 TUC DCB, 2006 WL
3147651, at *3-9 (D. Ariz. Oct. 31, 2006) (applying Arizona's certification requirement); Velazquez v. UPMC Bedford Memorial Hosp., 328 F. Supp. 2d 549, 557-58 (W.D. Pa. 2004) (applying
Pennsylvania's certificate requirement); Stanley v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 2d 805, 808 (N.D.
plaint);

VA. CODE ANN.

CODE ANN.
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Thurman Arnold great pleasure because it underscores the emptiness
of the terms "substance" and "procedure." Applying a truncated and
arguably crude version of the Erie doctrine, some courts have reasoned that these nominally procedural requirements for filing suit
2 33
must apply in federal court because they are really "substantive.
These legislative developments strike at the jurisprudential prerequisite for and normative assumption of trans-substantivity. Congress
and state legislatures matched special pleading requirements with a
myriad of substantive reforms, all directed toward the same set of
ends. If they are defined functionally, the reform packages demonstrate that the terms substance and procedure, and thus their dichotomy, are theoretically incoherent. As far as ends are concerned, a
host of substantive purposes-the encouragement of the capital markets, for example, or increased physician access-explode the normative assumption consistently held by procedural reformers from
Bentham to Clark: the assumption that the purpose of procedural
rules qua procedural rules is to facilitate the efficient resolution of
cases on their substantive merits. This new legal landscape for procedure, to say nothing of the highly politically charged processes from
which these pleading reforms emerged, precludes any claim that procedural reform is by definition a value-neutral enterprise.
B.

Trans-Substantivity in the Judiciary Since the Early 1990s

These legislative forays into rulemaking are certainly consistent
with a retreat from trans-substantivity as a foundational principle for
American civil procedure. But when compared to the quite different
pattern of behavior engaged in by court-supervised rulemakers over
W. Va. 2004) (applying West Virginia's certificate requirement); Ellingson v. Walgreen Co., 78 F.
Supp. 2d 965, 968 (D. Minn. 1999) (applying Minnesota's expert affidavit requirement); Finnegan v. Univ. of Rochester Med. Ctr., 180 F.R.D. 247, 249 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (applying New York's
affidavit requirement); Hill v. Morrison, 870 F. Supp. 978, 982 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (applying Missouri's expert affidavit requirement); cf Blumenkopf v. Conboy, No. 3:08 CV 457(MRK), 2008
WL 4196974, at *1 n.2 (D. Conn. Sept. 8, 2008) (stating, without holding, that Connecticut's
certificate requirement would apply in federal court under Erie R.R. Co., v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938)). But see Long v. Adams, 411 F. Supp. 2d 701, 706-09 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (refusing to
apply Michigan's expert affidavit requirement); Serocki v. MeritCare Health Sys., 312 F. Supp.
2d 1201, 1206-11 (D.S.D. 2004) (refusing to apply North Dakota's expert affidavit requirement);
Poindexter v. Bonsukan, 145 F. Supp. 2d 800, 808-10 (E.D. Tex. 2001) (refusing to apply Texas's
expert affidavit requirement); Baird v. Celis, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1360-62 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (refusing to apply Georgia's expert affidavit requirement under Erie); Cunningham v. Sandahl, No.
97 C 1109, 1998 WL 157415, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 1998) (refusing to apply Illinois's expert
affidavit requirement under Erie).
233. E.g., Holbrook v. Woodham, No. 05-304, 2007 WL 2071618, at *3 (W.D. Pa. July 13,
2007); Chapman v. Chandra, No. 06-cv-0651-MJR, 2007 WL 1655799, at *2-5 (S.D. Ill.
June 5,
2007); Ellingson v. Walgreen Co., 78 F. Supp. 2d 965, 968 (D. Minn. 1999).
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the same time period, these substance-specific reforms actually reaffirm the institutional allocation of rulemaking power that early twentieth-century reformers achieved with the assistance of the transsubstantivity principle.
1.

The Supreme Court and the Construction of the Federal Rules

In a series of recent decisions on pleading standards, the Supreme
Court has expressed a commitment to the substance-procedure dichotomy by refusing to accept the judicial revision of procedural rules
to meet perceived substantive needs. 234 The trans-substantivity princi-

ple plays a starring role.
By the 1980s, courts in a number of circuits had departed from Rule
8's minimal pleading standard and crafted substance-specific requirements for complaints in various doctrinal areas. 235 Litigation under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 figured prominently in this evolution. Official immunity doctrine serves a particular substantive policy goal, striking the
right balance between individual redress and deterrence of misconduct on one hand, and the need to make possible the vigorous discharge of public duties on the other.2 36 Starting in the 1960s, 237 some
courts determined that Rule 8's minimal pleading threshold frustrated
the latter half of the balance. Sinking officials into the muck of discovery, for example, would detract from the discharge of their important public duties. 238 Particularized, heightened pleading
requirements developed as a response and required plaintiffs to sur-

mount a higher barrier to discovery and thereby achieve the goal of
239

protecting officials.
On three occasions, the Supreme Court has rebuffed such constructions of Rule 8, denying that procedural requirements in the Federal
Rules can change based on concerns of substantive policy. In
234. See Jones v. Bock, 594 U.S. 199 (2007); Swierkiewicz v. Norema N.A., 534 U.S. 506
(2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
163 (1993).
235. See, e.g., Boston & Me. Corp. v. Town of Hampton, 987 F.2d 855, 863-67 (1st Cir. 1993);
see also Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 444-51 (1986) (describing the evolution of special pleading requirements in securities fraud, civil rights, and conspiracy cases). See generally Christopher M.
Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987 (2003) (discussing the trend in
lower courts toward heightened pleading requirements); Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1749 (1998) (same) [hereinafter Marcus, Puzzling
Persistence].
236. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 505-06 (1978).
237. See Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed Frivolous: Application of Stringent Pleading Requirements in Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 935, 948 (1990).
238. See, e.g., Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1476-79 (5th Cir. 1985).
239. Id. at 1479.
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Leatherman v. Tarrant County, the Supreme Court rejected a heightened pleading standard for claims of municipal liability under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. To buttress official immunity doctrine, the Fifth Circuit
had required that plaintiffs plead with particularity facts showing why
defendants cannot successfully invoke an immunity defense. 240 Although it sympathized with the problems that civil rights litigation created for government officials, the Court denied that such concerns
could justify a departure from trans-substantivity and Rule 8's minimal standard.2 41 A court could not legitimately craft substance-spe242
cific pleading requirements through common law adjudication.
The Court reacted similarly in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. to lower
2 43 It
court efforts to raise pleading standards for Title VII allegations.
did not allow lower courts to require particularized allegations of fact
for employment discrimination claims, rejecting the contention that a
higher pleading threshold would protect against unwarranted suits by
disgruntled employees. 244 Finally, in its 2007 Jones v. Bock decision,
the Court on similar grounds rejected a specific pleading rule for
245
prison litigation claims.
This emphasis on a single pleading standard regardless of substance
suggests an abiding fealty to the trans-substantivity principle. Put simply, the same pleading rules should apply uniformly unless the Federal
Rules expressly provide otherwise.2 4 6 Decided accordingly, the Rule
8 cases are at least indicative of, if not expressly committed to, the
same institutional allocation of rulemaking power that procedural reformers pioneered in the early twentieth century. As the Court insisted in Jones, "[C]ourts should generally not depart from the usual
practice under the Federal Rules on the basis of perceived policy concerns. '24 7 Appeals for substance-specific pleading requirements, the
Court elsewhere arguably intimated, should go to Congress. 248 A
240. See, e.g., id.
241. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
163, 168-69 (1993); cf Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998) (noting in a civil rights
case that "questions regarding pleading... are most effectively resolved by ...the rulemaking
process" and not case-by-case determinations).
242. See Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168; see also Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 582 (2006)
("Specific pleading requirements are mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and not,
as a general rule, through case-by-case determinations of the federal courts.").
243. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
244. Id. at 515.
245. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 213-14 (2007).
246. See Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
247. Jones, 549 U.S. at 212. For speculation as to why the Court qualified this statement with
"generally," see Burbank, supra note 17, at 549 n.70.
248. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 596 (1998).
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message about the legitimacy of court-forged procedural rules
emerges from these decisions: trans-substantive rules are properly
within the judicial province, while substance-specific ones should not
emerge from case-by-case adjudication.
In one sense, the message from the Court's two most recent pleading cases-Bell Atlantic v. Twombly 249 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal2 5 0-reaffirms this commitment to trans-substantivity. The Court in Twombly,
an antitrust conspiracy case, jettisoned a fifty-year-old minimal pleading threshold. 25' In its stead, the Court provided that "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level," 252 and that Rule 8 requires complaints to contain "allegations
plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)" liability. 25 3 Although the Court gave no explicit indication that it intended to restrict
this new construction of Rule 8 to antitrust claims, the opinion is
opaque, and in its wake the question as to whether the plausibility
standard applied only to antitrust claims arose. 254 Two years later, the
Court revisited Rule 8 in Iqbal and confirmed Twombly's trans-substantive application, noting that an antitrust limitation would be "in'2 55
compatible with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In another sense, the Twombly-Iqbal story with respect to transsubstantivity is more complicated. Although nominally trans-substantive, both decisions bespeak hostility to the underlying substantive
claims. Moreover, and perhaps more problematically, the pleading
standard adopted in Twombly and clarified in Iqbal may well license
lower courts to forge the sort of substance-specific applications that
the other three pleading decisions rejected and otherwise preclude.
Part V discusses this issue. 256 For the time being, the Rule 8 line of
decisions expresses a larger message about the continued viability of
trans-substantivity, the relevance of the substance-procedure dichotomy for the construction of procedural rules, the need for indifference
to substantive value in rule application, and the institutional limits on
and legitimacy of court-supervised rulemaking.
The Rule 8 cases are only several of the Court's many forays into
civil procedure over the last four decades, so the preceding discussion
249. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
250. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
251. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
252. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
253. See, e.g., id. at 557.
254. See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, PlausibilityPleading,49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 457-60 (2008)
(addressing this issue).
255. lqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1953.
256. See infra notes 301-308 and accompanying text.
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is a preliminary attempt to distill a larger message about trans-substantivity. Another indicator arguably seconds the message identified
in this caselaw. From 1938 until 1973, the Court addressed only five
times, and in somewhat cursory fashion, the Rules Enabling Act's
"substantive rights" restriction. 257 It adopted a test-a proposed rule

passes statutory muster if it "really regulates procedure" 258-that
vested procedural rulemakers with an expansive license to craft rules
with significant substantive effects. 25 9 A reluctance to police the substance-procedure boundary more vigilantly might suggest judicial indifference to it. If so, however, the Court's much more frequent
engagement with the restriction since 1973-more than a dozen decisions, with increasingly stronger language, albeit in dicta, as to the limited power of court-supervised rulemakers 2 6 0-perhaps underlines a
particular concern for the legitimacy of court-crafted procedural rules
261
and their substantive ramifications.
2.

Trans-Substantivity and the Rule-Making Process

The various bodies that participate in the process for the promulgation of the Federal Rules have similarly remained committed to the
trans-substantivity principle since the early 1990s. Although transsubstantivity can be in the eye of the beholder, by one count only six
subsections of the more than ninety Federal Rules currently in force
are substance-specific. 262 Since 1992, the Advisory Committee has

considered a number of substance-specific rule changes and recommended for adoption only a single arguably substance-specific one,
namely, a service of process requirement for Bivens actions. 2 63 On the
257. See 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4509 (1996) (criticizing the interpretation of this provision in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 312 U.S. 1 (1941)); Burbank, supra note 16, at 1028-32 (same).
258. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14.
259. Cf. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1987) ("Rules which incidentally
affect litigants' substantive rights do not violate this provision if reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of that system of rules."); see also Burbank, supra note 16, at 1034 (discussing
Sibbach and arguing that it "fails to suggest any limitations on the Court under the Rules Enabling Act that are more restrictive than the limitations on Congress under the Constitution").
260. See, e.g., Semtek Int'l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503 (2001); Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 845 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613
(1997).
261. See Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and ProceduralLaw Reform: A Callfor a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 843 (1993) (contending that the Supreme Court in 1993 grappled
seriously with this provision of the Rules Enabling Act for the first time since 1941).
262. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1)(C), 4.1(b), 5.2(c), 12(a)(3), 23, 71.1. Rules governing habeas
corpus and admiralty are exempted because these subjects have historically been governed by
their own sets of procedural rules.
263. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, CIVIL RULES SUGGESTIONS DOCKET
(Historical).
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subject of pleading, the Advisory Committee has frequently at least
discussed substance-specific amendments to Rule 8.264 But it has re-

peatedly declined to take action on such proposals, several times

2 65
stressing the need to keep procedure separate from substance.

Also, a recognition that "seemingly procedural pleading rules are surreptitiously motivated by distaste for the substantive rights or defenses subjected to higher standards"-a lack of value-neutrality and
blindness to the substance-procedure dichotomy-has deterred the
266
adoption of "claim-specific pleading rules.
Each federal district also has authoritative rulemaking powers to

craft local rules "not inconsistent with" the Federal Rules.2 67 Commentators have invoked this aspect of federal practice to insist that
federal procedure is hardly uniform or trans-substantive. 268 Certainly

federal districts have enacted a number of substance-specific local
rules. 269 The Middle District of Florida, for example, uses substance
as one factor to determine which track a case will follow for case management purposes, 270 and the Western District of Pennsylvania has a

pleading rule for pro se prisoner civil rights cases. 271 But rather than
confirm the illusion of trans-substantivity in federal civil procedure,
local rules should convey the opposite message. A survey of ten federal districts shows that only about five percent of all local rules could

arguably be deemed substance-specific.

272

264. See, e.g., REPORT, ADVISORY COMMITEE ON CIVIL RULES, WASHINGTON, D.C., Nov.
17-18,2008, at 180; REPORT, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, WASHINGTON, D.C., Nov.
8-9, 2007, at 269; Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Committee, May 22-23, 2006, at 38; Minutes,
Civil Rules Advisory Committee, October 27-28, 2005, at 30; Minutes, Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules, May 3-5, 1993, at 17.
265. See, e.g., REPORT, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, WASHINGTON, D.C., Nov.
8-9, 2007, at 269; REPORT, CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, Dec. 12, 2006, at 18.
266. Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Committee, May 22-23, 2006, at 38; see also Minutes, Civil
Rules Advisory Committee, Oct. 27-28, 2005, at 30 (observing that the adoption of substancespecific pleading rules "has manifest substantive overtones and might augment concerns that
heightened pleading requirements spring from distaste for some varieties of legal rights"); Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Oct. 21-23, 1993, at 8 (noting that "the real risk that
imposing specific pleading requirements for specific legal theories will be seen as a substantive
decision that these theories are disfavored").
267. FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
268. See, e.g., David M. Roberts, The Myth of Uniformity in Federal Civil Procedure:Federal
Civil Rule 83 and District Court Local Rulemaking Powers, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 537
(1985); David L. Shapiro, FederalRule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practiceof Rulemaking, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1978 (1989); Subrin, supra note 16, at 2012, 2026.
269. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 16, at 2025.
270. See M.D.

FLA.

R. 3.05.

271. See W.D. PA. R. 9.2.
272. See infra Appendix.
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Readily available records of deliberations of local rulemaking committees generally do not exist, and the Advisory Committee has rarely
invoked trans-substantivity by name as a restriction on its rulemaking
power.2 73 But like the Supreme Court, the behavior of these courtsupervised rulemakers signals that the principle retains some strength
as an institutional limit. Even as legislatures, by their actions, have
undermined the theoretical support for the substance-procedure dichotomy and the assumption of value-neutrality in procedural reform,
these bodies hew to the trans-substantivity principle as they craft and
construct procedural rules.
V. THE

FUTURE OF TRANS-SUBSTANTIVITY

Trans-substantivity in the early twenty-first century is a paradox of
sorts. It lacks a solid theoretical foundation. The principle depends
on the substance-procedure dichotomy as its jurisprudential prerequisite. But to jurisprudes like Thurman Arnold, the dichotomy eroded
long ago. Perhaps more significantly, the politics of rulemaking since
the 1970s has, in practical terms, dissolved a definable boundary in
practice between substance and procedure. Also, the normative assumption long made as to the purpose of procedural rules, another
theoretical underpinning, cannot survive unchallenged. Trans-substantive rules do not privilege any area of law, reflecting the notion, as
lawyers like Charles Clark and Roscoe Pound advocated, that procedural rules should have no purpose but to implement policy choices
made in the substantive law efficiently. Although trans-substantivity
can be consistent with other procedural purposes, 274 this one reflects
an attitude that is central to the rise of court-supervised rulemaking.
If value choice is equated with the choice of a particular goal of substantive policy, procedural rules, properly conceived, are value-neutral
and appropriately generated outside the political process. But the securities, prison, and medical malpractice litigation examples preclude
any claim that procedural rules necessarily must serve the purpose
that reformers identified for them. The pleading requirements in
these fields have substantive goals and are not in any sense valueneutral.
Even as theoretical support for the principle has weakened, however, the pattern of institutional behavior with respect to procedural
rulemaking continues to reflect the implications of trans-substantivity,
273. But see Minutes, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Feb. 16-17, 1995 (considering an
amendment to Rule 23 and noting that "[r]evision should be trans-substantive, not only for mass
torts").

274. See generally Michael Bayles, Principlesfor Legal Procedure, 5 LAW & PHIL. 33 (1986).
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as understood by early twentieth-century reformers, for the allocation
of rulemaking power. Congress and state legislatures have embraced
substance-specific procedural rules as tools functionally indistinct
from substantive legal changes in order to achieve particular goals of
public policy. Court-supervised rulemakers by and large have refused
to follow suit. Perhaps a claim about the institutional limits of courtsupervised rulemaking lies in this divide. Procedural rules can be substance-specific for the achievement of substantive policy goals, but
only the political process can make them so.
What, then, should courts and legislatures make of the theoretically
suspect but practically meaningful trans-substantivity principle going
forward? Clark faced this paradox long ago. He argued vigorously
for court-supervised rulemaking as a value-free and thus legitimate
exercise.2 75 Yet, as a leading legal realist, he had to acknowledge that
nothing really distinguished substance from procedure, a prerequisite
for the claim that rulemaking differed in some intrinsic way from legislation. For Clark, however, this paradox did not require a choice
between willful blindness to theoretical sophistication or the abandonment of expert, apolitical rulemaking. He believed that even if the
dichotomy could not be located with "pin-point precision," the boundary between substance and procedure "is one of policy expressing an
ideal for a proper division of power and responsibility" for
276
rulemaking.
The future of trans-substantivity may be this: a theoretically problematic but functionally useful principle for the allocation of rulemaking power among various institutions. It works straightforwardly. A
court-supervised process can legitimately generate trans-substantive
rules, that is, rules not designed to achieve any particular goals of substantive policy. Any substance-specific rules must come from the political process. A preliminary defense of trans-substantivity as a
mechanism for dividing rulemaking power between courts and legislatures follows, as well as some thoughts for how this principle might
work in practice.
At the outset, it is important to clarify that the argument for transsubstantivity as a principle of allocation is not a defense of trans-substantivity per se. The principle may well create costs that substancespecific rules could avoid. These might include, among others, the economic inefficiencies generated when trans-substantive discovery
rules apply to cases whose informational needs do not warrant the
275. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
276. Clark & Wright, supra note 174, at 364.
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expansiveness that the discovery rules permit.2 77 The normative value
of trans-substantivity on its own merits is a difficult question and not
one answered here. What is at issue is not whether the principle itself
is desirable but rather, as a matter of legal process, who should have
the power to depart from a trans-substantivity default in rulemaking.
The normative assumption lurking in this question is not so much that
trans-substantivity itself is valuable but that the allocation of rulemaking power that it encourages leads to a desirable result.
A.

The Rationalefor Trans-Substantivity as a Principle
of Institutional Allocation

The argument for trans-substantivity as a mechanism for the allocation of rulemaking power raises two chief questions. First, why should
trans-substantivity limit the prerogative of court-supervised
rulemakers? Second, how meaningful is a trans-substantivity limit
when the practical distinction between substance and procedure does
not obtain?
The history of the principle suggests a ready answer to why transsubstantivity should act as an institutional limit: it helps legitimate
court-supervised rulemaking. This response presumes that court-supervised rulemaking is worth legitimating, an assumption beyond the
278
scope of this Article but probably one that is generally undisputed.
How does a trans-substantivity limit on rulemaking reach this desirable result? One response lies with the Rules Enabling Act's "substantive rights" restriction. Although nominally procedural, a rule
enacted to further a goal of substantive policy would arguably run
afoul of the statute and be illegitimate for that reason. But the "substantive rights" restriction, at least according to the prevailing interpretation, is a somewhat weak limit on the power of court-supervised
rulemakers. 279 Statutory invalidity is one, although not conclusive, argument for the illegitimacy of court-crafted, substance-specific rules.
Beyond statutory text, a trans-substantive limit strengthens the legitimacy of court-supervised rulemaking by restricting this process to
a core judicial function. Judicial control over some modicum of procedural rulemaking has a centuries-old pedigree in Anglo-American
law. 280 A certain kind of rulemaking, then, fits comfortably within the
277. See Subrin, supra note 15, at 45-46.
278. See, e.g., Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis,27 STAN. L. REV. 673, 674 (1975) ("The results of the Supreme Court's rule-making power have been spectacular.").
279. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1987).
280. See, e.g., Pound, supra note 151, at 171.
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ambit of traditional judicial powers. On the flip side, substance-specific procedural rules, insofar as they further a goal of substantive policy, encroach on legislative terrain.
Of course, courts, through common law adjudication, pursue substantive policy goals-attempts to regulate the primary activity of individuals-all the time. Nothing in the judicial role per se prohibits
unelected judges from pursuing substantive ends.2 81 But a difference
exists in the modes by which judges make substantive law. A restriction on prospective rulemaking that prohibits reforms designed for
particular substantive goals fits common beliefs about appropriate judicial roles. A court that decides a torts case exercises a central judicial function, even if in the process it entrenches particular substantive
values in precedent. The requirement that a court entrench substantive policy only piecemeal as it decides particular cases or controversies "limit[s] the business" of the judiciary "to questions ... in a form

historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process. '282 In contrast, a court that promulgates a black-letter-rule of
tort law, untethered from the facts of any case, would stray considerably from any recognizable judicial function and trespass markedly
onto legislative terrain. Few would doubt the democratic illegitimacy
of the second scenario, even if in practical effect it would differ little
from the first. Because a substantive policy goal would motivate a
substance-specific procedural rule, it would smack of the second scenario and suffer a legitimacy deficit for the same reason. 283 Moreover,
constitutional and statutory limits on court-supervised rulemaking
powers in the federal system may render the positive promulgation of
certain rules unlawful, even if courts could adopt them through the
284
exercise of federal common law rulemaking powers.
Implicit in the concern for legislative prerogative, as it was for the
procedural reformers of the early twentieth century, is the notion that
in order to be legitimate, court-supervised rulemaking must be value281. See Bone, supra note 16, at 949.
282. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
283. Arthur Vanderbilt, a prominent proceduralist of the early twentieth century and the chief
justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court, commented on this issue as follows:
Substantive law includes much more than legislation, it comprehends also the rights
and duties which have come down to us through the common law. . . . [T]he rulemaking power as to practice and procedure must not invade the field of the substantive
law as such. While the courts necessarily make new substantive law through the decision of specific cases coming before them, they are not to make substantive law wholesale through the exercise of the rule-making power.
Winberry v. Salisbury, 74 A.2d 406, 410 (N.J. 1950).
284. See Stephen B. Burbank, InterjurisdictionalPreclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal
Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 774 (1986).
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neutral. The trans-substantivity principle ensures at least a type of
value-neutrality because it denies rulemakers the power to pursue directly substantive policy ends through procedural rules.
This type of value-neutrality is just that-a type. Value, of course, is
not limited to substantive law. Any proposed procedural rule requires
a value choice. A trans-substantive minimal pleading standard would
facilitate access to courts, but it might allow baseless cases to proceed
to discovery and impose unfair costs on defendants. A trans-substantive heightened pleading standard might check against these costs but
interfere with court access. Quite a lot in terms of public policy rides
on the choice between the two. More generally, the normative assumption of Bentham and Field, namely, that the primary goal of procedural rules is the resolution of cases on their substantive merits, is
just that-normative. An equally trans-substantive purpose, but one
that would lead to quite different real-world results, is to ensure that
the benefits of litigation exceed their costs. The choice between the
two has major policy implications in terms of the ability of parties to
vindicate rights and the costs that they and their adversaries must bear
for this vindication. This sort of choice is not value-neutral, yet the
trans-substantivity principle would allow a court-supervised process to
make it. Why is this choice legitimate, while the choice of a substance-specific procedural rule is not?
The type of value-neutrality that trans-substantivity requires is admittedly limited, but it nonetheless fosters legitimacy through judicial
restraint for a couple of reasons. First, some version of interest representation legitimates the political process. Legislators can make value
choices for law because they represent everyone else in some manner
or another. The trans-substantivity principle would not guarantee the
equal representation of everyone's interests at the rulemaking table.
But in one sense, it would at least inhibit a conflict of interest between
rulemakers and some politically vulnerable group from manifesting itself in a proposed rule, and it would accordingly provide the rulemaking process with a sort of legitimacy. The requirement that procedural
rules apply equally across doctrinal categories makes it quite difficult
for rulemakers to single out a vulnerable group deliberately to bear a
particular procedural burden. In contrast, rulemakers who are free to
craft substance-specific rules might foist one on a group with whom it
has a conflict of interest.
Second, trans-substantivity might inculcate a norm of procedural
minimalism that would lead court-supervised rulemakers to avoid significant changes in procedural rules. At its heart, the principle's message is this: significant value choice in procedure belongs in the
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legislative arena. Even if the letter of the principle does not preclude
the selection of a heightened trans-substantive pleading standard over
a minimal one, rulemakers sensitive to the message of trans-substantivity might avoid any major changes to the rules for which they bear
responsibility. Arguably, the fate of the 1983 amendments to Rule 11
bears witness to this norm at work. Once its ramifications in terms of
its impact on civil rights litigation manifested themselves, the Advisory Committee revised the rule and thereby weakened the blow.
Finally, as a functional matter, assuming that a court-supervised
rulemaking process proceeds legitimately only when it avoids substantive value choices, the trans-substantivity principle is likely to
strengthen this legitimacy better than alternatives. An erstwhile Reporter to the federal Civil Rules Committee suggested a "decibel" test
as the mechanism for institutional allocation. If public clamor over a
proposed rule change reached a certain decibel level, this test would
remove the rule from the court-supervised process responsible for the
creation of the Federal Rules and require that Congress enact it.285
This test is inoperable. No means for measuring the decibel level exists, and the cutoff that sends the rule to Congress goes unspecified.
Moreover, as Linda Mullenix notes, because of the breakdown in the
substance-procedure dichotomy and the substantive effects of the procedural rules it unveils, interest groups will ensure that the requisite
deafening roar meets every proposed rule reform. 286 The trans-substantivity principle, in contrast, lends itself to easy application.
The second question asks how robustly trans-substantivity can serve
as an institutional limit, given that the substance-procedure dichotomy
has proven illusory. The principle promises legitimacy because it prevents court-supervised rulemakers from using their power to directly
achieve substantive ends. But if the breakdown of the substance-procedure dichotomy unveils the substantive effects of all procedural
rules, then how can courts legitimately proceed with any rulemaking
without breaching the trans-substantivity limit? If incidental substantive effects of nominally trans-substantive rules matter, then the transsubstantivity limit precludes any court-supervised rulemaking.
A difference exists, however, between nominally trans-substantive
procedural rules with substantive effects and expressly substance-specific procedure. This difference explains, at least by the Supreme
Court's measure, the lawfulness of the Federal Rules under the Rules

285. See Mullenix, supra note 25, at 836 (discussing the Reporter's proposal).
286. Id. at 837.
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Enabling Act's "substantive rights" limitation. 287 The difference is
not merely formal but suggests a meaningful limit on the exercise of
rulemaking power. A trans-substantivity limit better prevents
rulemakers operating outside the political process from crafting rules
to implement their own substantive preferences. A rulemaker might
worry about patient access to healthcare and thus desire to shield physicians from medical malpractice suits. Under the trans-substantivity
limit, if she wanted to use a heightened pleading standard for this purpose, she would have to accept a raised barrier in all types of cases. In
other words, she could not restrict the effects of her heightened pleading standard to the medical malpractice setting and would have to accept frustrated litigation elsewhere, perhaps in doctrinal areas she
favors. An inability to keep the costs of her proposal internalized to
the area that she wants to reform might dissuade her from acting.
Even if she is willing to use a blunt trans-substantive tool to achieve a
particular end, her colleagues on the rulemaking body might prove
reluctant to promulgate such a broadly sweeping reform if they could
not cabin its effects.
Additionally, the justificatory rhetoric for trans-substantive rules
differs from substance-specific procedure. The illusory boundary between substance and procedure aside, rulemakers can explain the
need for a generic heightened pleading standard without reference to
any choice of substantive policy. A medical malpractice pleading
standard, in contrast, would require some explanation for why lawsuits against doctors differ as a policy matter from all other doctrinal
areas. This justification and the substantive value choice it represents
would much more nakedly usurp legislative prerogative than a choice
expressed in traditionally procedural terms like "efficiency" or
''accuracy."
B.
1.

Trans-Substantivity As a Principleof Institutional
Allocation in Practice

Trans-Substantivity and Rule Promulgation

At a basic but important level, the trans-substantivity principle
would work fairly straightforwardly in practice. Any procedural rule
expressly phrased with reference to a particular doctrinal field would
have to come from a legislature and not through a court-supervised
rulemaking process. This limit decently fits the pattern of rulemaking
287. See Miss. Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1946): see also Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460, 464-65 (1965) (stating that procedural rules with incidental effects on substantive
rights are lawful under the Rules Enabling Act); Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) (same).
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activity engaged in by the Advisory Committee, but it is by no means
an obvious implication of the principle. In its Rule 8 decisions, the
Court suggested that the process for the promulgation of the Federal
Rules could legitimately generate substance-specific pleading standards in employment discrimination and other civil rights litigation,
although the Court itself could not do so.288 A proposed rule such as
"claims in § 1983 litigation must be supported by particularized allegations of fact," however, would clearly run afoul of the trans-substantivity limit. Because particular desired policy outcomes would
motivate a proposal like this one, trans-substantivity as a principle of
institutional allocation would require that Congress promulgate it.
The principle's application gets more complicated when procedural
rules do not neatly fit into either a trans-substantive or substance-specific pigeonhole. As discussed in Part II, a spectrum, not a black-andwhite boundary, separates trans-substantivity from substance-specificity.289 A nominally trans-substantive rule with a regular and predict-

ably differential impact on certain types of litigation presents more of
a challenge. What does the trans-substantivity principle make of the
Arizona medical professional pleading requirement mentioned in Part
II, or the amendments to Rule 11 adopted in 1983?
For these sorts of nominally trans-substantive rules, the principle
might require a two-step test to determine where on the spectrum the
rule fits. First would be an assessment of the rulemaker's motive. If
rulemakers can plausibly explain their motives in trans-substantive
terms-that is, in the traditional procedural terms of accuracy and efficiency-the rule they generate enjoys a presumption of legitimacy.
The 1983 amendments to Rule 11 pass this test; the Advisory Committee notes explaining them make no reference whatsoever to substance. 290 In contrast, the language used by the Arizona state
legislature to justify the Arizona medical professional pleading requirement concerned medical malpractice litigation. 291 It is doubtful
that a rulemaker, if she wanted to adopt this requirement for the federal system, could explain it differently. As such, it fails the first step
of the test, and it could not come from a court-supervised rulemaking
process.
288. See, e.g., Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212-13 (2007); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534
U.S. 506, 515 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,

507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
289. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
290. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (Advisory Committee Notes to 1983 Amendments).
291. See Cooper, supra note 40, at 20.
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The second step might consider the real-world effects of a nominally trans-substantive rule that an assessment of rulemaker motive
makes presumptively valid. Any such rule that has a particularly
marked impact on one category of claims or defenses would lose its
presumption of trans-substantivity, and a court-supervised rulemaker
would have to abstain from its promulgation. The 1983 amendments
to Rule 11 might have failed this step. Their disproportionate impact
on civil rights plaintiffs had such a specific and marked substantive
effect that only those blind to empirical realities could defend the rule
as genuinely trans-substantive. Of course, most procedural rules affect different substantive areas differently, so a test that rejected any
proposed rule with any disproportionate impact at all would be inoperable. Hence the presumption of legitimacy is rebutted only if the
impact is particularly marked. Obviously, this standard would require
judgment calls by rulemakers, but shadowy, ill-defined parameters for
292 It
rulemaking are nothing new for the federal rulemaking process.
would have the salutary effect of encouraging empirical research into
procedure and possibly local, district-level experimentation with proposed rule changes before their final promulgation.
2.

Trans-Substantivity and Rule Construction

The trans-substantivity principle would also operate to constrain judicial construction of nominally trans-substantive rules. The Court in
its Rule 8 decisions did not react to the terms of the rule itself but
rather rejected entrenched, substance-specific applications of Rule 8
by lower courts in particular doctrinal areas. Likewise, the principle
would counsel courts against these sorts of constructions.
Beyond pleadings, an example of a substance-specific construction
that runs afoul of trans-substantivity is the maturity concept and its
application in mass tort class actions through Rule 23.293 According to
this concept, a mass tort is immature so long as plaintiffs have inferior
access to evidence and the legal basis for the tort is not yet established. It matures as plaintiffs begin to win individual cases, demon2 94
strating the evidentiary and legal plausibility of the claims.
Some of those who find merit in the concept advocate a maturity
limit on class certification in mass tort cases. Before the tort matures,
the argument goes, class certification is improper because, if granted,
292. The Rules Enabling Act's "substantive rights" limitation, as construed by the Supreme
Court, is a good example. See supra notes 257-259 and accompanying text.
293. For a summary of the orthodox maturity account, see Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis
of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1821, 1842-44 (1995).
294. Id.
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it would exert a distorting effect on the parties' settlement incentives.
Defendants should have little incentive to settle immature torts, as
they do not yet have a solid foundation in the applicable substantive
law. But certification threatens defendants with a risk, however marginal, of a debilitating judgment on a massive scale. The threat of an
unlikely but devastatingly large verdict pressures defendants into settlements that are unwarranted by the substantive strength of the
plaintiffs' claims. 295 In its most prominent judicial applications to
date, the maturity concept has led to findings under Rule 23(b)(3) that
class actions are not superior to individual cases for the prosecution of
claims. 296 As one court declared in a case involving a "novel" theory
of liability, 297 why should companies "be forced by fear of the risk of
bankruptcy to settle even if they have no legal liability," as they would
if the class was certified before a requisite number of individual trials
could go forward and "reflect a consensus, or at least a pooling of
298
judgment," as to the strength of the plaintiffs' claims?
In theory, the maturity concept could work in any class action. Almost without exception, however, courts have only invoked it in mass
tort class actions. 299 In other words, the maturity concept operates as
a regular, substance-specific application of Rule 23(b)(3). In several
important instances, the concept operated to cloak judicial hostility to
the substantive strength of the plaintiffs' theories of liability. 300 It thus
can readily amount to an evaluation of a claim's substantive value-a
substantive policy, value-laden determination-in procedural guise.
The trans-substantivity principle would counsel against such judicial
adventurism without prior congressional approval.
Finally, the trans-substantivity principle militates against upper
court constructions of trans-substantive rules that would predictably
lead to substance-specific procedure in lower courts. The models in
295. See RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SET-rLEMENT 44 (2007).
296. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746-49 (5th Cir. 1996); In re RhonePoulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299-1300 (7th Cir. 1995).
297. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1296.
298. Id. at 1299-1300.
299. Courts in the First, Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have used the maturity concept to
affect class certification in mass torts cases. In addition to Rhone-Poulenc and Castano, see, for
example, Barreras Ruiz v. Am. Tobacco Co., 180 F.R.D. 194, 198 (D.P.R. 1998); Arch v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 494-95 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D.
505, 528 (E.D. Tex. 1995). The Manualfor Complex Litigation (Fourth) addresses the maturity
concept as part of its discussion of mass tort case management. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.314 (2004). But cf Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 192 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussing maturity in a securities class action while
acknowledging that "many securities fraud claims do not generally implicate maturity
concerns").
300. See, e.g., Castano, 84 F.3d at 747-48; Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1298.
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this regard are Twombly and Iqbal. For fifty years before 2007, the
Supreme Court consistently hewed to a bright-line rule for pleading:
"a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless
it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."' 30 1 Twombly
302
discarded this approach for its flexible "plausibility" standard.
Consideration of the costs, particularly those relating to discovery,
that a minimal pleading threshold generates in a complex antitrust
case motivated the Court's decision to jettison Conley's more lax standard. 30 3 Iqbal not only reaffirms the plausibility standard, it also confirms that an evaluation of the likely costs of litigation are relevant to
30 4
what pleading threshold a plaintiff must meet.
Precisely what the Twombly pleading standard requires stirred debate and probably remains uncertain after Iqbal.30 5 One interpretation takes the Court's expressed concern for the costs of litigation as a
guide, leading to a "sliding-scale" standard for pleading: as the anticipated costs of litigation, however defined, rise, the plaintiffs' obliga30 6
tion to include more particularized obligations does as well.
In theory, this "sliding-scale" standard is trans-substantive. Significant costs, regardless of the case's doctrinal basis, will necessitate a
higher pleading threshold. But because presumed costs might often
depend on the doctrinal category a case fits into, Twombly and Iqbal
might also engender consistently substance-specific lower court applications. Courts faced with cases against state officials, for example,
recite by rote certain costs-"the diversion of official energy from
pressing public issues," "the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office," and "the danger that fear of being sued will
dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute ... in the unflinching
discharge of their duties" 3 7-that they have repeatedly invoked as
justification for particularized allegations in complaints. 30 8 In other
words, courts weigh their perception as to the substantive value of
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
Bell At. Corp., v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
Id. at 558.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access,
94 IOWA L. REV. 873 (2009); Spencer, supra note 254.
306. See Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Village of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 803-04 (7th Cir. 2008);
Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Nov. 8-9, 2007, at 32 (noting that "strong support"
exists in the lower courts for the proposition that, after Twombly, "[gireater pleading detail is
required in cases that threaten to impose massive pretrial and trial burdens").
307. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted).
308. See Fairman, supra note 13, at 583-90; see also Amnesty Int'l, USA v. Battle, 559 F.3d
1170, 1177 (11th Cir. 2009) (reaffirming a heightened pleading standard in certain § 1983 cases).
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
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§ 1983 litigation as they calibrate procedural requirements. If
Twombly and Iqbal license courts to do so, and if § 1983 cases consistently involve the same presumed costs, then courts might routinely
and regularly apply the new standard in order to require particularized allegations in civil rights cases. This nominally trans-substantive
standard will metamorphose in application into a number of substance-specific procedural rules that differ from doctrinal category to
doctrinal category.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's recent decision to jettison a fifty-year-old interpretation of Rule 8 and the rejuvenation of pleading litigation that
the 1938 authors intended "to wither and die" 30 9 show at a minimum
that nothing is sacred in American civil procedure. The uncertain future of trans-substantivity, a "foundational assumption" of the 1938
rules, 310 is further evidence of this fact. Although central to the design
of American procedural systems since the early nineteenth century,
the principle has taken a licking in recent years and potentially fatal
cracks appear in its theoretical foundation. Nonetheless, trans-substantivity remains robust, if not as a jurisprudential matter, then as a
practical matter, as the actions of rulemakers in the federal system
demonstrate. The principle plays, and should continue to play, an important role as a mechanism for the allocation of rulemaking power.
If it does, it will strengthen the legitimacy of court-supervised
rulemaking going forward.

309. Marcus, supra note 235, at 1749.
310. Burbank, supra note 17, at 536.
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APPENDIX: SUBSTANCE-SPECIFIC LOCAL RULES

Counting rules alone is an inexact science, and determining which
rules are substance-specific and which are not adds a further element
of arbitrariness to the exercise. I have tried to be over inclusive in my
count of substance-specific rules. I have included, for example,
DUCivR 16-2(c) from the District of Utah, which exempts cases involving incarcerated parties from an arbitration program. The rule is
nominally trans-substantive, but it overwhelmingly would apply in
prisoner civil rights cases. I have excluded bankruptcy, admiralty, and
habeas corpus rules, as these areas of law have traditionally been covered by their own procedural rules. Substance-specificity in these areas does not suggest a tendency toward or away from transsubstantivity.
Others undertaking a similar exercise doubtlessly would arrive at
slightly different figures, so I offer this data as illustrative and disclaim
any suggestion that they are exact. But a slight difference in the total
of substance-specific rules for a federal district would not take away
from my argument that federal districts have remained quite consistent to the trans-substantive ideal in their local rulemaking.
TABLE 1
PREVALENCE OF SUBSTANCE-SPECIFIC RULES

Total Local
Rules

Federal District

Total SubstanceSpecific Local
Rules

Percentage of
SubstanceSpecific Local
Rules

N.D. Cal.
D. Utah
N.D. Ill.
N.D. Tex.
D. Mass.
D. Alaska
D.S.D.

122
77
144
78
62
77
42

7
3
7
3
2
4
1

5.7%
3.9%
4.9%
3.8%
3.2%
5.2%
2.4%

M.D. Fla.

65311

5

7.7%

E.D. Va.
W.D. Pa.

28
69

3
7

10.7%
10.1%

I_
311. This figure does not include the district's local admiralty rules.

Average 5.8%
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2

SUBSTANCE-SPECIFIC LOCAL RULES BY DISTRICT

Federal District Substance-Specific Local Rules
Rule 3-4(a)(4) (specifying particular requirements for
entitling complaint in immigration cases, Privacy Act
cases, or APA cases)
0 Rule 3-7 (providing filing requirements for securities
cases)
E Rule 16-5 (specifying timeline for cases reviewing
administrative record)
N Rule 16-6 (specifying particular rules for U.S. debt
collection cases)
NRules 23-1 and 23-2 (providing class action requirements
for securities cases)
a Rule 58-1 (providing entry of judgment requirements for
securities cases)

N.D. Cal.

*

D. Utah

a Rule DUCivR 5-3 (filing and in forma pauperis
requirements for civil rights actions)
NRule DUCivR 16-1(a)(1)(A) (exempting certain
categories of cases from scheduling conference and
scheduling order requirements)
* Rule DUCivR 16-2(c) (exempting cases involving
incarcerated parties from ADR program)

N.D. 11.

NLR3.4 (filing requirements for cases brought under
patent and trademark laws)
* LR5.7(b) (filing requirements for False Claims Act cases)
* LR8.1 (filing requirements for Social Security Act cases)
* LR16.1 (exempting certain categories of cases from Rule
16 pretrial procedures)
* LR16.3 (providing for voluntary mediation program for
Lanham Act cases)
* LR54.4 (providing for specific procedures for entering
judgment in foreclosure cases)
* LR81.1 (providing filing requirements for § 1983 cases
brought by persons in custody)

N.D. Tex.

mLR 5.3 (filing requirements for prisoner civil rights cases)
* LR 9.1 (various requirements for social security and
black lung cases)
mLR 16.1 (providing exemptions for categories of cases
from scheduling and planning requirements of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 16(b))

D. Mass.

" Rule 16.2 (providing exemptions for categories of cases
from scheduling and planning requirements of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 16(b))
m Rule 35.1 (providing particular requirements for
disclosure of medical information in personal injury
cases)
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D. Alaska

D.S.D.

M.D. Fla.

E.D. Va.

W.D. Pa.
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mRule 9.1 (providing filing requirements for Social
Security Act cases)
mRule 16.1 (providing exemptions for categories of cases
from scheduling and planning requirements of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 16(b))
mRule 16.3 (providing various requirements for appeals
from administrative agencies)
0 Rule 81.2 (providing hearing requirements for
naturalization petitions)
0 LR 16.1 (providing exemptions for categories of cases
from scheduling and planning requirements of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 16(b))
a Rule 1.03(e) (providing filing requirements for prisoner
cases)
0 Rule 1.05(e) (providing filing requirements for prisoner
cases)
mRule 3.05 (assigning cases to various tracks based on
substantive category)
mRule 8.02 (exempting cases based on constitutional rights
from arbitration referral)
mRule 9.03 (providing categories of cases subject to
mediation)
mLocal Civil Rule 4(C) (providing filing requirements for
prisoner cases)
mLocal Civil Rule 16(A) (providing exemptions for
categories of cases from scheduling and planning
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b))
mLocal Civil Rule 71A (providing specific requirements
for land condemnation actions)
• LR 9.2 (providing filing requirements for prisoner cases)
8 LR 9.3 (providing appellate procedural rules for prisoner
cases)
0 LR 16.1.2 (allowing court to require filing of case
statement for RICO cases)
mLR 16.1.3 (providing for various tracks depending in part
on substantive category of case)
mLR 35.1 (providing for impartial medical exam for cases
where medical condition in controversy)
mLR 71A.1 (providing filing requirements for land
condemnation actions)
mLR 72.1.4 (providing specific powers to magistrate judges
for cases challenging conditions of confinement)
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